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Abstract 
There is vast heterogeneity in the human willingness to weigh others’ interests in decision making. This 
heterogeneity concerns the motivational intricacies as well as the strength of other-regarding behaviors, 
and raises the question how one can parsimoniously model and characterize heterogeneity across several 
dimensions of social preferences while still being able to predict behavior over time and across 
situations. We tackle this task with an experiment and a structural model of preferences that allows us 
to simultaneously estimate outcome-based and reciprocity-based social preferences. We find that non-
selfish preferences are the rule rather than the exception. Neither at the level of the representative agent 
nor when we allow for several preference types do purely selfish types emerge in our sample. Instead, 
three temporally stable and qualitatively different other-regarding types emerge endogenously, i.e., 
without pre-specifying assumptions about the characteristics of types. When ahead, all three types value 
others’ payoffs significantly more than when behind. The first type, which we denote as strongly 
altruistic type, is characterized by a relatively large weight on others’ payoffs – even when behind – and 
moderate levels of reciprocity. The second type, denoted as moderately altruistic type, also puts positive 
weight on others’ payoff, yet at a considerable lower level, and displays no positive reciprocity, while 
the third type is behindness averse, i.e., puts a large negative weight on others’ payoffs when behind and 
behaves selfishly otherwise. We also find that there is an unambiguous and temporally stable assignment 
of individuals to types. In addition, we show that individual-specific estimates of preferences offer only 
very modest improvements in out-of-sample predictions compared to our three-type model. Thus, a 
parsimonious model with only three types captures the bulk of the information about subjects’ social 
preferences. 
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1 Introduction 
A large body of evidence suggests that social preferences can play an important role in economic 
and social life.1 It is thus key to understand the motivational sources and the distribution of social 
preferences in a population, and to capture the prevailing preference heterogeneity in a parsimonious 
way. Parsimony is important because in applied contexts tractability constraints typically impose serious 
limits on the degree of complexity that theories can afford at the individual level. At the same time, 
however, favoring the most extreme form of parsimony – by relying on the assumption of a 
representative agent – is particularly problematic in the realm of social preferences because even 
minorities with particular social preferences may play an important role in strategic interactions. The 
reason is that social preferences are often associated with behaviors that change the incentives even for 
those who do not have those preferences.2 This means that even if only a minority has social preferences 
they can play a disproportionately large role for aggregate outcomes. Thus, we need to be able to capture 
the relevant components of social preference heterogeneity while still maintaining parsimony and 
tractability.  
It is our objective in this paper to make an important step in this direction. For this purpose we 
use a structural model of social preferences that is capable of capturing both preferences for the 
distribution of payoffs between the players and preferences for reciprocity. These types of social 
preferences have played a key role in the development of this subject over the last 15 to 20 years and 
their relative quantitative importance is still widely debated (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Falk et al., 2008; Engelmann & Strobel, 2010). However, in 
the absence of an empirically estimated structural model it seems difficult to make progress on such 
questions. Therefore, we implement an experimental design that enables us to simultaneously estimate 
distribution-related preference parameters and the parameters related to (positive and negative) 
reciprocity preferences. Similar to Andreoni and Miller (2002) as well as Fisman et al. (2007), our design 
involves the choice between different payoff allocations on a budget line. The size of the parameters 
                                                      
1 See, e.g., Roth, 1995; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Camerer, 2003; Engelmann & Strobel, 
2004; Bandiera et al., 2005; Fisman et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2008, 2009; Erlei, 2008; Bellemare et al., 2008, 
2011; Bellemare & Shearer, 2009; Kube et al., 2012, 2013; Cohn et al., 2014; Cohn et al., 2015; Fisman et al., 
2015; Fisman et al., 2017; Almas et al., 2016; Kerschbamer & Muller, 2017. The evidence on social preferences 
has spurred the development of numerous models (Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; 
Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002). 
2 For example, a selfish proposer in the ultimatum game may have a reason to make fair offers even if only a 
(significant) minority of the responders is willing to reject unfair offers. Likewise, a selfish employer in a gift 
exchange game may have a reason to pay high, non-market clearing wages, although “only” a minority of 
employees reciprocates to high wages with higher effort. Also, in public good situations, a minority of players 
willing to punish free-riders can induce selfish players to contribute (see, e.g., Fehr & Schmidt 1999). 
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estimated from a sequence of binary choices then informs us about the relative importance of different 
preference components.3 However, most importantly, our experiment provides a rich data set that allows 
us to characterize the distribution of social preferences in our study population of 174 Swiss university 
students at three different levels: (i) the representative agent level, (ii) the intermediate level of a small 
number of distinct preference types and (iii) the individual level.  
From the viewpoint of achieving a compromise between tractability and parsimony, and the 
goal of capturing the distinct qualitative properties of important minority types the intermediate level is 
most interesting. We approach this level by applying finite mixture models that endogenously identify 
different types of preferences in the population without requiring any pre-specifying assumptions about 
the existence and the preference properties of particular types. This means, for example, that we do not 
have to assume, say, a selfish or a reciprocal type of individuals. Rather, the data themselves “decide” 
which preference types exist and how preferences for the distribution of payoffs and for reciprocity are 
combined in the various types. Taken together, our finite mixture approach enables us to simultaneously 
identify (i) the preference characteristics of each type, (ii) the relative share of each preference type in 
the population and (iii) the (probabilistic) classification of each subject to one of the preference types. 
The third aspect has the nice implication that our finite mixture approach provides us with the 
opportunity to make out-of-sample predictions at the individual level without the need to estimate each 
individual’s utility function separately.  
Which preference types do our finite mixture estimates yield? We find that a model with three 
types best characterizes the distribution of preferences at the intermediate level. A model with three 
types is best in the sense that it produces the most unambiguous classification of subjects into the 
different preference types4. Moreover, this classification and the preference properties of the three types 
are temporally stable. In contrast, models with two or four types produce a more ambiguous 
classification of subjects into types and are associated with severe instabilities of the preference 
properties of the various types across time.  
At the substantive level, what are the preference properties of the different types and how large 
are their shares in our study population? The preferences of the three types are best described as (i) 
strongly altruistic, (ii) moderately altruistic, and (iii) behindness averse. Interestingly, all three types 
show some other-regarding behaviors, i.e., purely selfish types do not emerge. This non-existence of a 
                                                      
3  This also allows us to assess the long-standing claim in the literature (see e.g., Charness & Rabin, 2002; 
Offerman, 2002; Al-Ubaydli & Lee, 2009) that negative reciprocity is generally more important than positive 
reciprocity. 
4 The assignment of individuals to a preference type is completely unambiguous if the individual belongs to the 
type either with probability one or probability zero. Intermediate probabilities mean that the assignment contains 
some ambiguity. See Section 3.3 for details. 
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purely selfish type is not an artefact of our methods because we can show with Monte Carlo simulations 
(see online supplement) that our finite mixture approach would identify the selfish type if it existed. In 
addition, all three types weigh the payoff of others significantly more in the domain of advantageous 
inequality (i.e., when ahead) than in the domain of disadvantageous inequality (i.e., when behind), and 
for all of them the preference parameters that capture preferences for the distribution of payoffs are 
generally quantitatively more important than preferences for reciprocity.  
The strong altruists, which comprise roughly 40% of our subject pool, put a relatively large 
positive weight on others’ payoffs regardless of whether they are ahead or behind. In terms of 
willingness to pay to increase the other player’s payoff by $1, the strong altruists are on average willing 
to spend 86 Cents when ahead and 19 Cents when behind. In addition, they also display moderate levels 
of positive and small levels of negative reciprocity, i.e., for them negative reciprocity is the weaker 
motivational force than positive reciprocity.  
The moderate altruists, which comprise roughly 50% of our subject pool, put a significantly 
lower, yet still positive weight on others’ payoffs. They display no positive but a small and significant 
level of negative reciprocity. A moderate altruist is on average willing to pay 15 Cents to increase the 
other player’s payoff by $1 when ahead and 7 Cents when behind. It may be tempting to treat this low-
cost altruism as unimportant. We believe, however, that this would be a mistake because social life is 
full of situations in which people can help others at low cost. Many may, for example, be willing to give 
directions to a stranger and help a colleague, both of which is associated with small time cost, or donate 
some money to the victims of a hurricane although they may not be willing to engage in high-cost 
altruism. 
Finally, the behindness averse type comprises roughly 10 percent of the subject pool and is 
characterized by a relatively large willingness to reduce others’ income when behind – spending 78 
Cents to achieve an income reduction by $1 – but no significant willingness to increase others’ income 
when ahead or when treated kindly.  
As mentioned above, one remarkable feature of our finite mixture estimates is that no purely 
selfish type emerges, suggesting that other-regarding preferences are the rule not the exception. This 
conclusion is also suggested by the preference estimates for the representative agent which are 
characterized by intermediate levels of altruism – in between the strong and the moderately altruistic 
types. The absence of an independent selfish type does of course not mean that there are no 
circumstances – such as certain kinds of competitive markets – in which the assumption of self-
interested behavior may well be justified.5 However, it means that if one makes this assumption in a 
                                                      
5 One of the nice features of the various social preference models (e.g., Levine, 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 
Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) is that they show that the self-interest assumption may be unproblematic in certain 
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particular context there is a need to justify the assumption because many people may not behave selfishly 
in these contexts because they are selfish but because the institutional environment makes other-
regarding behavior impossible or too costly.  
Our preference estimates for the representative agent model reinforce the conclusion regarding 
the relative importance of distributional versus reciprocity preferences. For the representative agent 
distributional preferences are considerably more important than reciprocity preferences. In the absence 
of any kindness or hostility between the players the representative agent is, for example, willing to spend 
33 Cents to increase the other player’s payoff by $1 when ahead. If – in addition – the other player has 
previously been kind the representative agent’s willingness to pay increases to 50 Cents at most. 
Moreover, preferences for negative reciprocity do not seem substantially stronger than preferences for 
positive reciprocity.6 Relying on the preference estimates of the representative agent may however, be 
seriously misleading because according to these estimates behindness averse behaviors can only occur 
as a random (utility) mistake while in fact a significant minority of the subject pool – the behindness 
averse type – has clear preferences for income reductions when behind.  
An important aspect of our study are the out-of-sample predictions based on the type-
classification mentioned above, because such out-of-sample predictions are among the most stringent 
tests of a model. To study the extent to which our type-specific social preference estimates are capable 
of predicting individual behavior in other games, the subjects also participated in several additional 
games. In the first class of games they participated as second-movers in a series of ten trust games with 
varying costs of trustworthiness; in the second class of games they participated in two games in which 
they could reward and punish the previous behavior of another player. We are particularly interested in 
the question whether individual predictions based on our type-specific preference estimates are as good 
as individual predictions based on individual preference estimates. If this were the case, our type-based 
model would not only capture the major qualitative social preference types in a parsimonious way but 
there would also be no need to further disaggregate the preference estimates for predictive purposes. 
The results show indeed that our three-type model achieves this goal. If we predict each individual’s 
behavior in the additional games on the basis of their types’ preferences, we substantially increase the 
predictive power over a model that just uses demographic and psychological personality variables as 
predictors. Moreover, despite its parsimony, the predictive power of the type-based model is almost as 
good as the predictions that are based on estimates of each individual’s preferences.  
                                                      
environments because subjects with social preferences behave as if self-interested. Thus, by assuming self-
interested subjects in these situations one does not make a mistake. 
6 The finding that negative reciprocity does not seem substantially stronger than positive reciprocity is in line with 
recent work by DellaVigna et al. (2016), who use a field experiment to estimate the magnitude of workers’ social 
preferences towards their employers. 
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Thus, taken together the out-of-sample predictions indicate a remarkable ability of the three-
type model to predict individual variation in other games. The predictive exercise also enables further 
insights into the strengths and the weaknesses of the type-based model. On the positive side, we find 
that the strength of specific behaviors such as rewarding others for a fair act is in line with the type-
based model. The strong altruists reward more than the moderate altruists while the behindness averse 
types do not reward at all. Likewise, as predicted by the model, the behindness averse types display a 
considerably higher willingness to punish unfair actions (when behind) than the strong or moderate 
altruists. However, we also find patterns that cannot be fully reconciled with the type-based model. In 
particular, the behindness averse types should never reciprocate trust in the trust games because they 
don’t put a positive value on other’s payoff, but in fact we observe that they are trustworthy at moderate 
cost levels. These findings indicate limits in our model’s ability to predict individuals’ behavior out-of-
sample. However, these limits also provide potentially useful hints about ways to improve our approach. 
We discuss this in Section 4.5 of the paper.  
How does our paper relate to the existing literature? Our paper benefits from the insights of the 
previous literature on the structural estimation of social preferences at the individual level such as 
Andreoni and Miller (2002), Bellemare et al. (2008, 2011) and Fisman et al. (2007, 2015). However, in 
contrast to this literature, the purpose of our paper is to provide a parsimonious classification of 
individuals to – endogenously determined – preference types and a characterization of the distribution 
of social preferences in terms of individuals’ assignment to a small number of types. The results of the 
paper show that basically all individuals are unambiguously assigned to one of three mutually exclusive 
types and that individual preference estimates do not lead to superior out-of-sample predictions relative 
to the much more parsimonious three-type model7. There are also several other differences between 
these papers and our paper. First, our paper simultaneously identifies outcome-based social preferences 
and preferences for reciprocity while the above-mentioned papers – with the exception of Bellemare et 
al. (2011) – focus exclusively on outcome-based social preferences. Second, in contrast to our 
assumption of piecewise linearity, the structural models of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et 
al. (2007, 2015) are based on a CES utility function with own and others’ payoff as arguments, which 
rules out behindness aversion, but has the advantage of enabling the identification of potential non-
linearities in indifference curves.8 Third, and relatedly, the experimental design in Fisman et al. (2007) 
involves budget lines that allow for interior choices, whereas our study does not allow for interior 
solutions. The piecewise linear model we use is perhaps more tractable than nonlinear models for the 
                                                      
7 The three-type model uses in total 12 estimated preference parameters (4 for each type) to make out-of-sample 
predictions for 160 individuals while the out-of-sample predictions based on individual preferences use 160 ´ 4 = 
640 estimated preference parameters.  
8 In section 3.2 of the online supplement, we also estimate a random utility model with a CES utility function on 
our data and cannot reject the null hypothesis of a piecewise linear utility function. 
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finite mixture estimation with data from our binary choice task, but its applicability to situations that are 
fundamentally different, e.g. allocation decisions from convex choice sets, may be limited. Fourth, the 
structural model in Bellemare et al. (2008) rules out the existence of altruism and pure selfishness. This 
assumption in the paper by Bellemare et al. (2008) may explain why they find a large amount of 
inequality aversion while we do not find evidence for a separate type that simultaneously dislikes 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. However, Bellemare et al. (2008) showed that young and 
highly educated subjects in their representative subject pool display significantly less inequality aversion 
than other socioeconomic groups. Therefore, the absence of a simultaneous dislike of advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequality in our data set could be due to the fact that our subject pool consists 
exclusively of university students. A recent paper by Kerschbamer and Muller (2017) supports this 
conjecture. This paper is based on a large heterogeneous sample of 3,500 individuals in the German 
Internet Panel and the non-parametric approach to the elicitation of social preferences developed by 
Kerschbamer (2015). Roughly 2/3 of the subjects in this data set exhibit inequality aversion, i.e., a 
simultaneous dislike of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality.  
Our paper is also related to the literature that characterizes latent heterogeneity in social 
preferences using finite mixture models. Previous studies in this literature mainly focus on distributional 
preferences and typically classify subjects into predefined preference types. For instance, Iriberri & Rey-
Biel (2011, 2013) elicit distributional preferences with a series of modified three-option dictator games 
and apply a finite mixture model to classify subjects into four predefined types. Similarly, studies by 
Conte & Moffatt (2014), Conte & Levati (2014), and Bardsley & Moffatt (2007) use behavior in public 
good and fairness games, respectively, to classify subjects into predefined types. Such a priori 
assumptions may or may not be justified. For example, all of these studies assume the existence of a 
purely selfish type but as our analysis indicates a purely selfish type may not exist if one allows for 
sufficiently small costs of other-regarding behaviors. Likewise, often behindness aversion is not a 
feasible type by assumption and therefore the structural model cannot identify such types. The only 
study we are aware of that identifies types endogenously instead of predefining them is by Breitmoser 
(2013). This study relies on existing dictator game data from Andreoni & Miller (2002) and Harrison & 
Johnson (2006) for testing the relative performance of different preference models with varying error 
specifications. However, this study as well as the others mentioned in this paragraph do not 
simultaneously estimate distributional and reciprocity-based preferences, nor do they compare the 
power of the type-specific and individual estimates in making out-of-sample predictions across games. 
Finally, our paper also contributes to the literature concerned with the stability of social 
preferences. Most studies in this literature analyze behavioral correlations. For example, Volk et al. 
(2012) and Carlson et al. (2014) report that contributions to public goods appear to be stable over time 
in the lab as well as in the field. Moreover, there is evidence that behaviors such as trust (Karlan, 2005), 
charitable giving (Benz & Meier, 2008), and contributions to public goods (Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011; 
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Laury & Taylor, 2008) seem to be correlated between the lab and field settings. Blanco et al. (2011) 
study the within-subject stability of inequality aversion across several games in order to understand 
when and why models of inequality aversion are capable of rationalizing aggregate behavior in games. 
However, most of these studies do not estimate a structural model of social preferences, which would 
be necessary for making precise quantitative behavioral predictions. As a consequence, they do not 
characterize the distribution and the overall characteristics of social preferences in the study population. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our behavioral model 
and describes the experimental design. Section 3 covers our econometric strategy for estimating the 
behavioral model’s parameters at different levels of aggregation. Section 4 presents the results and 
discusses their stability over time and across games. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2 Behavioral model and experimental design 
2.1 Behavioral model 
To characterize the distribution of social preferences at the aggregate, the type-specific and the 
individual level and to make out-of-sample predictions across games, we need a structural model of 
social preferences. To achieve our goals we apply a two-player social preference model inspired by Fehr 
& Schmidt (1999) and Charness & Rabin (2002) which we extended to make it also capable of capturing 
preferences for reciprocity. In the outcome-based part of the model, Player A’s utility, 
𝑈𝑈" = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ∗ Π" + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 ∗ Π-, (1) 
is piecewise linear, where Π" represents player A's payoff, and Π- indicates player B's payoff.  
𝛼𝛼 = 1 if Π" < Π-, and 𝛼𝛼 = 0 otherwise (disadvantageous inequality); 
𝛽𝛽 = 1 if Π" > Π-, and 𝛽𝛽 = 0 otherwise (advantageous inequality). 
 
Depending on the values of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽, subjects belong to different preference types: A subject whose 𝛼𝛼 
and 𝛽𝛽 are both zero is a purely selfish type, because she does not put any weight on the other player’s 
payoff. If 𝛼𝛼 < 0 the subject is behindness averse, as she weights the other’s payoff negatively whenever 
her payoff is smaller than the other’s. Analogously, if 𝛽𝛽 > 0 the subject is aheadness averse, since she 
weights the other’s payoff positively whenever her payoff is larger than the other’s. Consequently, a 
subject who is both behindness and aheadness averse with 𝛼𝛼 < 0 < 𝛽𝛽 and – 𝛼𝛼 < 𝛽𝛽 is a difference averse 
type for whom disadvantageous inequality matters less than advantageous inequality. In case 𝛼𝛼 < 0 <
𝛽𝛽 and – 𝛼𝛼 > 𝛽𝛽, the subject is difference averse too, but disadvantageous inequality matters more than 
advantageous inequality; this is the case discussed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A subject with 𝛼𝛼 > 0 
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and 𝛽𝛽 > 0 is an altruistic type, as she always weights the other’s payoff positively. In contrast, a subject 
with 𝛼𝛼 < 0  and 𝛽𝛽 < 0  is a spiteful type, since she puts a negative weight on the other’s payoff, 
regardless of whether she is behind or ahead. Finally, a subject with 𝛼𝛼 > 0 > 𝛽𝛽  exhibits quite 
implausible preferences, since she weights the other’s payoff positively when she is behind, and 
negatively when she is ahead. We do not expect to observe such preferences in our data.  
Because we are also interested in the subjects’ willingness to reciprocate kind or unkind acts, 
we extend model (1) to account for positive and negative reciprocity. The extension is similar to 
Charness & Rabin (2002) who take only negative reciprocity into account and Bellemare et al. (2011) 
who consider both positive and negative reciprocity. Player A’s utility in the extended model is 
𝑈𝑈" = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∗ Π" + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∗ Π-, (2) 
where 𝛾𝛾 and 𝛿𝛿 indicate whether positive or negative reciprocity play a role. More formally, 
𝛾𝛾 = 1 if player B behaved kindly towards A, and 𝛾𝛾 = 0 otherwise (positive reciprocity); 
𝛿𝛿 = 1 if player B behaved unkindly towards A, and 𝛿𝛿 = 0	otherwise (negative reciprocity). 
 
A positive value of 𝛾𝛾 in equation (2) means that player A exhibits a preference for positive reciprocity, 
i.e. a preference for rewarding a kind act of player B by increasing B’s payoff. A negative value of 𝛿𝛿 
represents a preference for negative reciprocity, i.e. a preference for punishing an unkind act of player 
B by decreasing B’s payoff. In sum, the piecewise linear model does not only nest major distributional 
preferences, but it also quantifies the effects of positive and negative reciprocity. 
2.2 Experimental design 
This subsection describes the experimental design. The experiment consists of two sessions per 
subject that took place three months apart from each other, one in February and one in May 2010. To 
test for temporal stability, both sessions included the same set of binary decision situations that allow 
us to estimate the subjects’ preference parameters. 
In each binary decision situation, the subjects had to choose one of two payoff allocations 
between themselves and an anonymous player B. We implemented two types of such binary decision 
situations: (i) dictator games for identifying the parameters 𝛼𝛼  and 𝛽𝛽 , and (ii) reciprocity games for 
identifying 𝛾𝛾 and 𝛿𝛿. In addition to these two types of binary decision situations, the second session in 
May 2010 comprised a series of trust games plus two reward and punishment games for checking the 
stability of the estimated preferences across games. 
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2.2.1 Dictator games 
In each dictator game, a subject in player A’s role can either increase or decrease player B’s 
payoff by choosing one of two possible payoff allocations, 𝑋𝑋 = (Π:", Π:-) or 𝑌𝑌 = (Π=", Π=-). To identify 
the subject’s distributional preferences, governed by 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽, we varied the cost of changing the other 
player’s payoff systematically across the dictator games. 
--- FIGURE 1 --- 
Figure 19 illustrates the dictator games’ design. Each of the three circles represents a set of 13 
dictator games in the payoff space. In each of these dictator games, a line connects the two possible 
payoff allocations, 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌. The slope of the line therefore represents A’s cost of altering B’s payoff. 
For example, consider the decision between the two options marked in black: The slope of the line is 
−1, implying that player A has to give up one point of her own payoff for each point she wants to 
increase player B’s payoff. Hence, if A chooses the upper-left of these two allocations, we know that 
A’s 𝛼𝛼 is greater than 0.5, since the marginal utility from increasing B’s payoff, 𝛼𝛼, needs to exceed the 
marginal disutility of doing so, 1 − 𝛼𝛼. If, in contrast, A opts for the lower-right allocation, then A’s 𝛼𝛼 
is lower than 0.5. Thus, by systematically varying the costs of changing the other player’s payoff across 
all dictator games – i.e. the slope of the line – we can infer A’s marginal rate of substitution between 
her own and the other player’s payoff. This allows us to directly identify the corresponding parameters 
of the subjects’ distributional preferences, 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽. 
The 45° line separates the dictator games in which A’s payoff is always smaller than player B’s 
from the ones in which A’s payoff is always larger than B’s. Thus, the observed choices in the upper 
(lower) circle allow us to estimate the value of 𝛼𝛼 (𝛽𝛽) in a situation of disadvantageous (advantageous) 
inequality. The choices in the middle circle contribute to the identification of both 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽, as each of 
them involves an allocation with disadvantageous inequality as well as an allocation with advantageous 
inequality. 
We constructed the dictator games such that the identifiable range of the parameters is between 
−3 and 1. The bunching of the lines ensures that the estimated preferences yield the highest resolution 
around parameter values of zero that separate the different preference types. The high resolution around 
parameter values of zero also implies that our experimental design is particularly well suited for 
discriminating between purely selfish subjects and subjects that exhibit only moderately strong social 
preferences. Monte Carlo simulations, summarized in sections 1 and 2 of the online supplement, confirm 
                                                      
9 For better readability, Section 5 of the online supplement contains all figures in color and serif free font. 
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that our experimental design indeed reliably discriminates between purely selfish preferences and 
moderately strong social preferences. 
2.2.2 Reciprocity games 
In addition to the dictator games, each subject played 39 positive and 39 negative reciprocity 
games. The reciprocity games simply add a kind or unkind prior move by player B to the otherwise 
unchanged dictator games. In this prior move, B can either implement the allocation 𝑍𝑍 = (Π@", Π@-) or 
let the subject choose between the two allocations 𝑋𝑋 = (Π:", Π:-) and 𝑌𝑌 = (Π=", Π=-). Letting the subject 
choose between 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 instead of implementing 𝑍𝑍 is either a kind or an unkind act from the subject’s 
point of view. Hence, if player B decides not to implement 𝑍𝑍, the subject may reward or punish B in her 
subsequent choice between 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌.  
In the positive reciprocity games, player A is strictly better off in both allocations 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 than 
in allocation 𝑍𝑍, while B is worse off in at least one of the two allocations 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 than in allocation 𝑍𝑍. 
Consider the example with 𝑋𝑋	= (1050, 270), 𝑌𝑌 = (690, 390), and 𝑍𝑍 = (550, 530). If player B forgoes 
allocation 𝑍𝑍  and lets A choose between the allocations 𝑋𝑋  and 𝑌𝑌 , she acts kindly towards A as she 
sacrifices some of her own payoff to increase A’s payoff. Thus, if player A has a sufficiently strong 
preference for positive reciprocity, i.e. a positive and sufficiently large 𝛾𝛾, she rewards B by choosing 
allocation 𝑌𝑌 instead of allocation 𝑋𝑋. 
In the negative reciprocity games, player A is strictly worse off in both allocations 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 than 
in allocation 𝑍𝑍, while B is better off in at least one of the two allocations 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 than in allocation 𝑍𝑍. 
For example, consider the case where 𝑋𝑋 = (450, 1020), 𝑌𝑌 = (210, 720), and 𝑍𝑍 = (590, 880). If B does 
not implement 𝑍𝑍 and forces A to choose between the allocations 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌, she acts unkindly towards A 
as she decreases A’s payoff for sure in exchange for the possibility of increasing her payoff from 880 to 
1020. Hence, if A has a sufficiently strong preference for negative reciprocity, i.e. a negative and 
sufficiently small 𝛿𝛿, she punishes B by opting for allocation 𝑌𝑌 instead of allocation 𝑋𝑋. 
We applied the strategy method (Selten, 1967) in the reciprocity games to ask the subject how 
she would behave if player B gives up allocation 𝑍𝑍, and forces her to choose between the allocations 𝑋𝑋 
and 𝑌𝑌. Consequently, any behavioral differences in the choices among 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 between the dictator 
games and the corresponding reciprocity games have to be due to reciprocity. Based on such behavioral 
differences we can identify the parameters 𝛾𝛾 and 𝛿𝛿 that reflect the subjects’ preferences for positive and 
negative reciprocity.10 
                                                      
10 In this context, it is important to note that Brandts & Charness (2011) show that the strategy method typically 
finds qualitatively similar effects compared to the direct response method. Moreover, when we use the estimated 
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Taken together, we developed a design based on binary decision situations that are cognitively 
easy to grasp. We systematically vary the payoffs such that we are able to identify the parameters for 
the subjects’ distributional preferences, 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽. Only small changes are necessary to extend the design 
such that we are additionally able to identify the reciprocity parameters, 𝛾𝛾 and 𝛿𝛿. 
2.3 Implementation in the lab 
As already mentioned, we conducted two experimental sessions per subject that were three 
months apart. All subjects were recruited at the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich. 200 subjects participated in the first session in February 2010 (henceforth denoted 
Session 1) and were exposed to 117 binary decision situations involving a block of 39 dictator games 
(see section 2.2.1) and a block of 78 reciprocity games (see section 2.2.2) as well as a questionnaire 
soliciting cognitive ability, demographic data, and personality variables (i.e. the big five personality 
dimension). Out of these 200 subjects, 174 subjects (87%) showed up in the subsequent session that 
took place in May 2010 (henceforth denoted Session 2). In Session 2, the subjects completed again the 
117 binary decision situations mentioned above. In addition, they played ten trust games plus the two 
reward and punishment games that are described in more detail in Section 4.5. We will use the 
preferences estimated from the dictator and reciprocity games to predict the behavior in the trust games 
and the reward and punishment games. 
The dictator and reciprocity games were presented in blocks and appeared in random order 
across subjects. In the dictator games, the subjects faced a decision screen on which they had to choose 
between the two allocations 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌. In the reciprocity games, the subjects initially saw allocation 𝑍𝑍 
during a random interval of 3 to 5 seconds, before they had to indicate their choice between the allocation 
𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌.11  
In Session 1, after the subjects completed all dictator and reciprocity games, we additionally 
assessed the potential of the reciprocity games for triggering the sensation of having been treated kindly 
or unkindly by player B. To do so, we asked the subjects to indicate on a 5-point scale as how kind or 
unkind they perceived player B’s action of forgoing allocation 𝑍𝑍 in a sample of 18 reciprocity games. 
The subjects’ answers, available in Table A1 in the appendix, show that the reciprocity games have 
indeed succeeded in triggering the perception of having been treated kindly and unkindly by the other 
player B. 
                                                      
preference parameters to predict behavior in other games we also apply the strategy method in these (other) games. 
Thus, we keep the mode of preference elicitation constant across the games in which reciprocity plays a role.  
11 Screenshots of a dictator and a reciprocity game are included in Figures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix. 
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As payment, each subject received a show-up fee as well as an additional fixed payment for 
filling out the questionnaire on her personal data. After finishing the session, three of the subject’s 
decisions as player A were randomly drawn for payment and each of them randomly matched to a 
partner’s decision who acted as player B. Both the subject as well as her randomly matched partner 
received a payment according to their decisions. The experimental exchange rate was 1 CHF per 100 
points displayed on the screen.12 The average payoff in Session 1 was 52.50 CHF (std.dev. 7.47 CHF; 
minimum 33.30 CHF; maximum 74.10 CHF) and 55.74 CHF in Session 2 (std.dev. 7.50 CHF; minimum 
28.60 CHF; maximum: 75.60 CHF). Both sessions lasted roughly 90 minutes. In Session 1 (2), the 
fraction of female subjects was 52% (53%) and the average age was 21.70 (21.75) years. 
The subjects received detailed instructions. We examined and ensured their comprehension of 
the instructions with a control questionnaire. In particular, we individually looked at each subject’s 
answers to the control questionnaire and handed it back in the (very rare) case of miscomprehension. 
Finally, all subjects answered the control questions correctly. They also knew that they played for real 
money with anonymous human interaction partners and that their decisions were treated in an 
anonymous way. 
3 Econometric strategy 
In this section, we first describe the random utility model in general which we apply for 
estimating the parameters of the behavioral model. Subsequently, we present three versions of the 
random utility model that vary in their flexibility in accounting for heterogeneity. 
3.1 Random utility model 
To estimate the parameters of the behavioral model, 𝜃𝜃 = (𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾, 𝛿𝛿), we apply McFadden’s 
(1981) random utility model for discrete choices. We assume that player A’s utility from choosing 
allocation 𝑋𝑋B = (Π:B" , Π:B- , 𝛽𝛽:B, 𝛼𝛼:B, 𝛾𝛾:B, 𝛿𝛿:B) in game 𝑔𝑔 = 1,… , 𝐺𝐺 is given by  
𝒰𝒰" 𝑋𝑋B; 𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎 = 𝑈𝑈
" 𝑋𝑋B; 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜀𝜀:B, (3) 
where 𝑈𝑈"(𝑋𝑋B; 𝜃𝜃)  is the deterministic utility of allocation 𝑋𝑋B , and 𝜀𝜀:B  is a random component 
representing noise in the utility evaluation. The random component 𝜀𝜀:B follows a type 1 extreme value 
distribution with scale parameter 1/𝜎𝜎. According to this model player A chooses allocation 𝑋𝑋B over 
                                                      
12 On February 1, 2010 the nominal exchange rate was 0.94 USD per CHF. 
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allocation 𝑌𝑌B if 𝒰𝒰"(𝑋𝑋B; 𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎) ≥ 𝒰𝒰"(𝑌𝑌B; 𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎). Since utility has a random component, the probability that 
player A’s choice in game g, 𝐶𝐶B, equals 𝑋𝑋B is given by 
= Pr 𝐶𝐶B = 𝑋𝑋B; 	𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎, 𝑋𝑋B, 𝑌𝑌B = Pr 𝑈𝑈
" 𝑋𝑋B; 𝜃𝜃 − 𝑈𝑈
" 𝑌𝑌B; 𝜃𝜃 ≥ 𝜀𝜀=B − 𝜀𝜀:B
= Pr 𝐶𝐶O = 𝑥𝑥; 	𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎, 𝑋𝑋O, 𝑌𝑌O =
exp 𝜎𝜎	𝑈𝑈" 𝑋𝑋B; 𝜃𝜃
exp 𝜎𝜎	𝑈𝑈" 𝑋𝑋B; 𝜃𝜃 + exp 𝜎𝜎	𝑈𝑈" 𝑌𝑌B; 𝜃𝜃
	. 
(4) 
Note that the parameter 𝜎𝜎 governs the choice sensitivity towards differences in deterministic utility. If 
𝜎𝜎 is 0 player A chooses each option with the same probability of 50% regardless of its deterministic 
utility. If 𝜎𝜎 is arbitrarily large the probability of choosing the option with the higher deterministic utility 
approaches 1. 
A subject 𝑖𝑖’s individual contribution to the conditional density of the model follows directly 
from the product of the above probabilities over all 𝐺𝐺 games: 
𝑓𝑓 𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎; 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌, 𝐶𝐶W = Pr 𝐶𝐶WB = 𝑋𝑋B; 	𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎, 𝑋𝑋B, 𝑌𝑌B
X(YZ[\:[)
]
B\^
	Pr 𝐶𝐶WB = 𝑌𝑌B; 	𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎, 𝑋𝑋B, 𝑌𝑌B
^_X(YZ[\:[), (5) 
where the indicator 𝐼𝐼(𝐶𝐶WB = 𝑋𝑋B) equals 1 if the subject chooses allocation 𝑋𝑋B and 0 otherwise.
13 
                                                      
13 In the Online Supplement of this paper, we analyze the robustness of the random utility model to different types 
of misspecification. In particular, we perform several Monte Carlo simulations to assess whether the estimators 
based on the random utility model remain robust if (i) the errors in the utilities are serially correlated across games, 
and (ii) subjects’ choices are generated by a more general constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function 
as proposed by Fisman et al. (2007). The Monte Carlo simulations yield two main results. First, as long as we do 
not estimate the model at the individual level, the estimators of the behavioral parameters are unbiased and highly 
accurate, even if the errors in the utilities are serially correlated (see section 1 in the Online Supplement). Note 
that we also report individual cluster robust standard errors throughout the paper, which remain valid even in case 
the errors are serially correlated across games. Second, if subjects’ choices are generated by a CES utility function, 
the estimators for the distributional preferences are biased. However, the absolute size of the bias is small unless 
the indifference curves are strongly convex over the payoffs 𝛱𝛱" and 𝛱𝛱-. Moreover, as our experimental task is 
not designed to identify the convexity of the subjects’ indifference curves, estimating a random utility model with 
a CES utility function offers little to no advantage in terms of overall accuracy compared to the random utility 
model with a piecewise linear utility function (see section 3.1 in the Online Supplement). Finally, besides the 
Monte Carlo simulations, we also estimate a random utility model with a CES utility function on our subjects’ 
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3.2 Aggregate estimation 
The first version of the random utility model pools the data and estimates aggregate parameters, 
(𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎) , that are representative for all subjects. These aggregate estimates represent the most 
parsimonious characterization of social preferences. They are useful mainly for comparisons with the 
existing literature, such as Charness & Rabin (2002) or Engelmann & Strobel (2004). However, since 
the aggregate estimates completely neglect heterogeneity they may fit the data only poorly and neglect 
important behavioral regularities that characterize non-negligible minorities among the subjects.  
3.3 Finite mixture estimation 
The second version takes individual heterogeneity into account and estimates finite mixture 
models. Finite mixture models are enough to take the most important aspects of heterogeneity into 
account, namely the existence of distinct preference types. But on the other hand, they remain relatively 
parsimonious, as they require much less parameters than estimations at the individual level. 
Finite mixture models assume that the population is made up by a finite number of 𝐾𝐾 distinct 
preference types, each characterized by its own set of parameters, (𝜃𝜃c, 𝜎𝜎c). This assumption of distinctly 
different preference types implies latent heterogeneity in the data, since each subject belongs to one of 
the 𝐾𝐾 types, but individual type-membership is not directly observable. Consequently, a given subject 
𝑖𝑖’s likelihood contribution depends on the whole parameter vector of the finite mixture model, Ψ =
(𝜃𝜃^, … , 𝜃𝜃e, 𝜎𝜎^, … , 𝜎𝜎e, 𝜋𝜋^, … , 𝜋𝜋e_^), and corresponds to 
ℓ(Ψ; 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌, 𝐶𝐶W) = 𝜋𝜋c	𝑓𝑓 𝜃𝜃c, 𝜎𝜎c; 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌, 𝐶𝐶W
e
c\^
. (6) 
It equals the sum of all type-specific conditional densities, 𝑓𝑓 𝜃𝜃c, 𝜎𝜎c; 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌, 𝐶𝐶W , weighted by the ex-ante 
probability, 𝜋𝜋c, that subject 𝑖𝑖 belongs to the corresponding preference type 𝑘𝑘. Since individual type-
membership cannot be observed directly, the unknown probabilities 𝜋𝜋c  are ex-ante the same for all 
subjects and equal to the preference types’ shares in the population. The parameter vector Ψ =
(𝜃𝜃^, … , 𝜃𝜃e, 𝜎𝜎^, … , 𝜎𝜎e, 𝜋𝜋^, … , 𝜋𝜋e_^) consists of 𝐾𝐾 type-specific sets of parameters reflecting the types’ 
preferences and choice sensitivities as well as 𝐾𝐾 − 1 parameters reflecting the types’ shares in the 
                                                      
actual choices and find no evidence that the subjects’ utility deviates from piecewise linearity (p-value = 0.619 in 
Session 1 and p-value = 0.407 in Session 2; for further details see section 3.2 in the Online Supplement). 
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population. Thus, estimating a finite mixture model results in a parsimonious characterization of the 𝐾𝐾 
types by their type-specific preference parameters and their shares in the population.14 
Once we estimated the parameters of the finite mixture model, we can endogenously classify 
each subject into the preference type that best describes her behavior. Given the fitted parameters, Ψ, 
any subject 𝑖𝑖’s ex-post probabilities of individual type-membership, 
𝜏𝜏Wc =
𝜋𝜋c𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃c, 𝜎𝜎c; 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌, 𝐶𝐶W)
𝜋𝜋j𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃j, 𝜎𝜎j; 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌, 𝐶𝐶W)
e
j\^
, (7) 
follows from Bayes’ rule. These ex-post probabilities of individual type-membership directly yield the 
preference type the subject most likely stems from. 
An important aspect of estimating a finite mixture model is to find the appropriate number of 
preference types 𝐾𝐾 that represent a compromise between flexibility and parsimony. If 𝐾𝐾 is too small, 
the model lacks the flexibility to cope with the heterogeneity in the data and may disregard minority 
types. If 𝐾𝐾 is too large, on the other hand, the model is overspecified and tries to capture types that do 
not exist. Such an overspecified model results in considerable overlap between the estimated preference 
types and an ambiguous classification of subjects into types. In either case, the stability and predictive 
power of the model’s estimates are likely compromised. 
Unfortunately, there is no general single best strategy for determining the optimal number of 
types in a finite mixture model. Due to the non-linearity of any finite mixture model’s likelihood 
function there exists no statistical test for determining 𝐾𝐾  that exhibits a test statistic with a known 
distribution (McLachlan, 2000)15. Furthermore, classical model selection criteria, such as the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), are known to perform badly 
in the context of finite mixture models. The AIC is order inconsistent and therefore tends to overestimate 
the optimal number of types (Atkinson, 1981; Geweke & Meese, 1981; Celeux & Soromenho, 1996). 
The BIC is consistent under suitable regularity conditions, but still shows weak performance in 
simulations when being applied as a tool for determining 𝐾𝐾 (Biernacki et al., 2000). 
                                                      
14 Note that estimating the parameters of a finite mixture model is tricky as the log likelihood function is highly 
nonlinear and potentially multimodal. To numerically maximize the log likelihood function, we followed the same 
approach as in Bruhin et al. (2010) and applied an EM-type algorithm before switching to direct maximization. 
15 Lo et al. (2001) proposed a statistical test (LMR-test) to select among finite mixture models with varying 
numbers of types, which is based on Vuong (1989)’s test for non-nested models. However, the LMR-test is 
unlikely to be suitable when the alternative model has non-normal outcomes Muthen (2003). 
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But in any case, the classification of subjects into preference types should be unambiguous in 
the sense that 𝜏𝜏Wc is either close to zero or close to 1, and the estimated type-specific parameters should 
be stable over time. We apply the normalized entropy criterion (NEC) to summarize the ambiguity in 
the individual classification of subjects into preference types (Celeux & Soromenho, 1996; Biernacki et 
al., 1999). The NEC allows us to select the finite mixture model with 𝐾𝐾 > 1 types that yields the cleanest 
possible classification of subjects into types relative to its fit. The NEC for 𝐾𝐾 preference types, 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 𝐾𝐾 =
𝑁𝑁(𝐾𝐾)
𝐿𝐿 𝐾𝐾 − 𝐿𝐿(1)
, (8) 
is based on the entropy, 
𝑁𝑁 𝐾𝐾 = − 𝜏𝜏Wc ln 𝜏𝜏Wc
p
W\^
e
c\^
≥ 0, (9) 
normalized by the difference in the log likelihood between the finite mixture model with 𝐾𝐾 types, 𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾), 
and the aggregate model, 𝐿𝐿(1). The entropy, 𝑁𝑁(𝐾𝐾), quantifies the ambiguity in the ex-post probabilities 
of type-membership, 𝜏𝜏Wc . If all 𝜏𝜏Wc  are either close to 1 or close to 0, meaning that each subject is 
classified unambiguously into exactly one behavioral type, 𝑁𝑁(𝐾𝐾) is close to 0. But if many 𝜏𝜏Wc are close 
to 1/𝐾𝐾, indicating that many subjects cannot be cleanly assigned to one type, 𝑁𝑁(𝐾𝐾) is large.  
One disadvantage of the NEC is that it is not defined in case of 𝐾𝐾 = 1. Hence, the NEC cannot 
be used to discriminate between the aggregate model with 𝐾𝐾 = 1 and the best performing finite mixture 
model with 𝐾𝐾 > 1 types.  
Consequently, we apply the following strategy to determine the optimal number of types in our 
estimations. First, we begin with the aggregate model and closely inspect its fit to the data. If we find 
major behavioral regularities that the aggregate model cannot explain, we treat this as an indication of 
potential heterogeneity and estimate finite mixture models with a varying number of types. An example 
of such a major behavioral regularity would be if the estimate of the representative agent’s preferences 
imply that she is altruistic, and hence will never reduce other subjects’ payoff, but we observe 
nevertheless a substantial share of subjects that in fact reduces the other players’ payoff. This would 
suggest a heterogeneous population with a majority of subjects motivated by altruism and a minority of 
subjects motivated by, for example, behindness aversion or negative reciprocity. When estimating finite 
mixture models to take such heterogeneity into account, we opt for the number of preference types 𝐾𝐾 
that minimizes the NEC and yields the cleanest segregation of subjects into types relative to the fit of 
the model. Finally, we examine whether the type-specific estimates of the behavioral parameters 𝜃𝜃c are 
stable over time. 
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3.4 Individual estimations 
Finally, the third version of the random utility model estimates the parameters, (𝜃𝜃W, 𝜎𝜎W) , 
separately for each subject. The resulting individual estimates reveal the full extent of behavioral 
heterogeneity in the data. However, they lack parsimony and likely suffer from small sample bias. 
Furthermore, Monte Carlo simulations indicate that the individual estimates tend to be strongly biased 
if the errors in subjects’ utilities are serially correlated (see section 1 in the Online Supplement). Thus, 
we expect them to be less stable over time than the aggregate estimates and the finite mixture models’ 
type-specific estimates. Moreover, a researcher interested in developing a parsimonious theoretical 
model with different social preference types may find it hard to infer the general behavioral patterns 
from a plethora of individual estimates. 
4 Results 
A key purpose of our study is to provide a characterization of the distribution of social 
preferences that is (i) parsimonious, (ii) captures the major qualitative regularities of the data, (iii) 
displays reasonable levels of stability over time, and (iv) is capable of predicting behavior out-of-sample 
in other games. To achieve this purpose we proceed as follows. First, we estimate the preference 
parameters of a representative agent and examine how well these parameters capture the various aspects 
of our data. Clearly, the representative agent model is the most parsimonious one but – as we will see 
below – it misses important behavioral regularities that are likely driven by a minority of subjects. 
Second, we estimate the parameters of a finite mixture model that allows for a small number of types 
without imposing ex-ante restrictions on the qualitative properties of the types. Third, we estimate the 
preference parameters for each individual separately thus allowing that each individual is its own 
preference type.  
We had to exclude 14 of the 174 subjects from the sample because they behaved very 
inconsistently. These 14 subjects switched several times between the allocations 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 within a given 
circle of the experimental design. In other words, they reversed their preferences for the other player’s 
payoff several times when the cost of doing so rose monotonically. Consequently, it is not possible to 
estimate the individual preferences of these 14 subjects. Their estimated choice sensitivity 𝜎𝜎 is close to 
0, indicating an abysmal fit of the empirical model. With 𝜎𝜎 almost 0, the preference parameters are no 
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longer identified and at least one of their estimates lies outside the identifiable range of −3 to 1. Hence, 
we dropped these 14 subjects and report all following results for the remaining 160 subjects.16 
4.1 Preferences of the representative agent 
Table 1 presents the parameter estimates (𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎) of the aggregate model that are representative 
for all subjects. The estimates indicate that the distributional preference parameters, 𝛼𝛼  and 𝛽𝛽 , are 
important for aggregate behavior. In both Sessions 1 and 2 the representative agent values the payoff of 
others positively (𝛼𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽𝛽 > 0) regardless of whether the other player is better or worse off. 
However, the valuation of the other player’s payoff is much higher when ahead than when behind, 
implying that the representative agent displays asymmetric altruism. More, specifically, in Session 1 
(2), the estimate of 𝛼𝛼 equals 0.083 (0.098) while the estimate of 𝛽𝛽 is much bigger and amounts to 0.261 
(0.245). Thus, the weight of the other player’s payoff is almost three times as high in situations of 
advantageous inequality than in situations of disadvantageous inequality (z-tests with 𝐻𝐻r: 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽 yield 
a p-value < 0.001 in both sessions). In terms of the willingness to pay, these numbers imply that the 
representative agent is willing to pay approximately 33 Cents to increase the other player’s payoff by 
$1 when ahead while when behind he is only willing to pay approximately 10.5 Cents.17 
--- TABLE 1 --- 
The estimates of the reciprocity parameters 𝛾𝛾 and 𝛿𝛿 imply that the subjects’ preferences are on 
average somewhat reciprocal. Kind acts increase the weight of the other player’s payoff (𝛾𝛾 > 0), while 
unkind acts decrease the weight of the other player’s payoff (𝛿𝛿 < 0). However, the magnitude of the 
estimated reciprocity parameters is small, suggesting that both positive and negative reciprocity play a 
less important role than distributional preferences. Moreover, although there seems to be a consensus in 
the literature that negative reciprocity is more important than positive reciprocity18  the preference 
                                                      
16 If we estimate the aggregate model and the finite mixture models on the sample with all 174 subjects, results 
remain robust. In particular, the parameter estimates of the aggregate model and the model with 𝐾𝐾 = 3 types are 
stable over time, while those of the models with 𝐾𝐾 = 2 and 𝐾𝐾 = 4 types vary significantly over time. Moreover, 
the estimated behavior in the aggregate model and the model with 𝐾𝐾 = 3 types remains qualitatively unchanged. 
17 The willingness to pay for a $1 increase in the other player’s payoff when ahead is given by 𝛽𝛽/(1 − 𝛽𝛽); when 
behind this willingness is given by 𝛼𝛼/(1 − 𝛼𝛼). With a value of 𝛽𝛽 = 0.25, which is in the confidence interval of 
the preference estimates for both sessions, a subject is willing to pay 33 Cents to increase the other’s payoff by $1 
when ahead. With a value of 𝛼𝛼 = 0.095, which is contained in the confidence interval for both sessions, a subject 
is willing to pay 10.5 Cents to increase the other’s payoff by $1 when behind.  
18 See, e.g., Charness & Rabin (2002), Offerman (2002) and Al-Ubaydli & Lee (2009). Only a recent paper by 
DellaVigna et al. (2016), who use a field experiment to estimate the magnitude of workers’ social preferences 
towards their employers, finds that negative reciprocity is not necessarily stronger than positive reciprocity. 
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estimates of the representative agent model do not support this. In fact, the parameter for positive 
reciprocity is even higher than the one for negative reciprocity (z-tests with 𝐻𝐻r: 𝛾𝛾 = 𝛿𝛿 yield a p-value < 
0.001 in both sessions). In sum, as in Charness and Rabin (2002), the estimates of the aggregate model 
clearly reject the hypothesis that in our sample the representative agent is exclusively motivated by 
selfishness. In fact, the representative agent shows a substantial concern for others’ payoff. 
The last column of Table 1 shows that aggregate behavior is also rather stable over time. The 
parameter estimates of 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽, and 𝛿𝛿 are clearly not significantly different between the Sessions 1 and 2. 
Only the estimates for positive reciprocity, 𝛾𝛾, and the choice sensitivity, 𝜎𝜎, differ significantly between 
the two sessions. The significant decline in 𝛾𝛾 across sessions suggests that positive reciprocity is a more 
fragile preference component compared to the other components.  
Note that this instability of the reciprocity parameter cannot be attributed to attrition bias 
because the estimates in Table 1 are based on the behavior of the same subjects in the two sessions. In 
addition, we find no evidence for attrition bias. The Session 1 estimates in the sample of all subjects 
who participated in that session are statistically indistinguishable from the Session 1 estimates in the 
subsample of the 160 subjects who participated in both sessions (see Table A2 in the appendix). 
How well do the preference parameters of the representative agent fit the aggregate data, and 
are there any unexplained behavioral regularities? In Figure 2, the solid lines represent the subjects’ 
empirical willingness to change the other player’s payoff at a given cost in Session 1, while the dashed 
lines correspond to their predicted willingness to change the other player’s payoff. 19 The predictions are 
based on the random utility model discussed in section 3.1 and use all dictator and reciprocity games. 
The panels on the left and right show the share of subjects willing to increase and decrease the other 
player’s payoff, respectively. The upper panels describe situations of disadvantageous inequality, while 
the lower panels describe situations of advantageous inequality. 
--- FIGURE 2 --- 
At first glance the aggregate model fits the data well, as the empirical and predicted shares of 
subjects willing to change the other’s payoff almost coincide. In particular, the lower-left and upper-left 
panels show that the share of subjects increasing the other’s payoff is higher in situations of 
advantageous than disadvantageous inequality. For example, at a cost of 0.39, more than 40 % of the 
subjects are willing to increase the other player’s payoff when ahead but less than 20% are willing to do 
so when behind. This is in line with the estimates 𝛽𝛽 > 𝛼𝛼 of the aggregate model. 
                                                      
19 Figure A3 in the appendix depicts Figure 2’s analogue for session 2, which is very similar. 
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There are, however, important behavioral regularities that the representative agent model fails 
to explain. The right panels of Figure 2 indicate that there exists a minority of subjects who decrease the 
other player’s payoff even at a cost, especially when they are behind. If all individuals would have 
qualitatively similar preferences as the representative agent, i.e., if all of them had a positive valuation 
of others’ payoff (𝛼𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽𝛽 > 0) there should be nobody who decreases the other player’s payoff. 
In fact, however, the right panels show that up to 20% of the subjects decrease other’s payoff. The 
aggregate model “neglects” these subjects in the sense that it assigns a positive 𝛼𝛼 and a positive 𝛽𝛽 to the 
representative agent because the share of subjects who increase the other’s payoff at a given cost level 
is larger than the share of subjects that decreases the other’s payoff (compare right to left panels).  
However, understanding the behavior of subjects that decrease the other player’s payoff can be 
crucial for predicting aggregate outcomes even if these subjects constitute only a minority. For example, 
in ultimatum games or public goods games with punishment, even a minority of subjects who are willing 
to reject unfair offers or punish freeriding can discipline a majority of selfish players and entirely 
determine the aggregate outcome (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). But the aggregate model absorbs the behavior 
of these subjects in the random utility component, as it is not flexible enough to take minorities of 
subjects into account whose preference parameters systematically differ from those of the majority. 
4.2 A parsimonious model of preference types 
In view of the relevance of the existence of minority types for aggregate outcomes it is important 
to be able to characterize the heterogeneity of preferences of suitably defined sub-populations. In 
addition, we need to be able to characterize the preferences of these subgroups because this provides 
insights into their potential role in social interactions. For example, it is important to know whether a 
subgroup values the payoffs of others generally negatively – which would define them as spiteful types 
– or whether they only value the payoffs of others negatively when behind or treated unkindly.20 
However, the a priori definition of subgroups or preference types is always associated with some 
arbitrariness and the danger that the pre-defined groups or preferences characteristics of the group do 
not do justice to the data. Therefore, we apply an approach that simultaneously identifies (i) the 
preference characteristics of each type, (ii) the relative share of each type in the population, and (iii) the 
assignment of each individual to one of the preference types.  
The finite mixture approach we use in this section fits this bill. To apply this approach we need 
to specify a priori the number of distinct preference types we consider. To obtain a compromise between 
flexibility and parsimony, we choose the number of preference types, 𝐾𝐾, based on the NEC (see section 
                                                      
20 Fehr et al. (2008) provide, for example, evidence that members of higher castes in India seem to have more 
frequently spiteful preferences. A generally negative valuation of others’ payoff may have very different 
implications for, e.g., contract design and other institutional design questions compared to negative reciprocity.  
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3.3). Figure 3 shows the NEC’s value for 𝐾𝐾 = 2, 𝐾𝐾 = 3, and 𝐾𝐾 = 4 preference types. In both sessions, 
the NEC favors a finite mixture model with 𝐾𝐾 = 3 preference types providing the cleanest assignment 
of subjects to types. This clean assignment of subjects to types is also reflected by the distribution of the 
individual posterior probabilities of type-membership 𝜏𝜏Wc: almost all of them are either very close to 1 
or 0, suggesting that almost all subjects are unambiguously assigned to one of the three preference types 
(for further details see section A7 and Figure A4 in the appendix). 
 
--- FIGURE 3 --- 
Furthermore, when judging the appropriateness of the assumed number of types, we also 
examine below whether qualitatively new types emerge if one increases 𝐾𝐾 or whether an increase in 
𝐾𝐾	is just associated with splitting up a given type while maintaining the sign of the various preference 
parameters. Finally, a further desirable feature when judging the appropriateness of the assumed number 
of types is that the preference characteristics of the different types should be relatively stable across 
time.  
Table 2 reports the results of our finite mixture estimates for both sessions. As in the case of the 
representative agent, the estimates of the parameters that capture outcome-based distributional 
preferences, 𝛼𝛼  and 𝛽𝛽 , are generally much higher than the reciprocity parameters, 𝛾𝛾  and 𝛿𝛿 . For this 
reason, we characterize the different types according to their distributional preference parameters. The 
table shows the existence of (i) a Moderately Altruistic (MA) type, (ii) a Strongly Altruistic (SA) type 
and (iii) of a Behindness Averse (BA) type. A remarkable feature of all three types is that they value the 
payoff of others’ much more when they are ahead than when behind. For this reason, one may also speak 
of Moderate (asymmetric) Altruists and Strong (asymmetric) Altruists. Another remarkable feature of 
Table 2 is that a purely selfish type, that puts zero value on others’ payoffs, does not exist. All types 
display positive or negative valuations of others’ payoffs.21 
 --- TABLE 2 --- 
The MA-type makes up roughly 50% of the population and puts positive but modest weight on 
the other player's payoff, regardless of whether they are ahead or behind. This type also displays 
basically no positive reciprocity but moderate levels of negative reciprocity. The distributional 
preferences of the MA-type (inferred from Session 1) implies that members of this group are on average 
                                                      
21 Separate selfish types also do not emerge if we increase the number of types to 𝐾𝐾 = 4 (see Table A4) in the 
appendix). With four distinct types, we further disaggregate the group of MA-types. Moreover, Monte Carlo 
Simulations show that the finite mixture model reliably identifies a selfish type if it is present in the population, 
even if errors in utility are serially correlated (see section 2 in the online supplement). 
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willing to spend 15 Cents to increase the other player’s payoffs by $1 when ahead and 7 Cents when 
behind. Thus, the MA-types are willing to behave altruistically when the cost is relatively low. Note that 
the identification of this type crucially relies on our experimental design’s power to reliably discriminate 
between purely selfish preferences and moderately strong social preferences. 
The SA-type roughly comprises between 35% and 40% of the population. Subjects in this group 
display a valuation of the other player’s payoff that is two to three times larger than that of the MA-
type. The Strong Altruists also show relatively high levels of positive reciprocity and somewhat lower 
levels of negative reciprocity. Based on their distributional preferences (in Session 1) the SA-type is 
willing to spend 86 Cents to increase other player’s payoff by $1 when ahead and 19 Cents when behind. 
Moreover, if a strong altruist has been treated kindly, such that the positive reciprocity parameter 
becomes relevant, the willingness to increase the other’s payoff increases to 159 Cents when ahead and 
45 Cents when behind.22 Thus, this group indeed displays rather strong social preferences.  
Finally, the BA-type comprises roughly 10% of the population and weighs the other player's 
payoff negatively in situations of disadvantageous inequality. Interestingly, this type also tends to value 
others’ payoffs negatively when ahead but the relevant preference parameter 𝛽𝛽  is not significantly 
different from zero. This type also displays no significant preferences for positive or negative 
reciprocity. However, the behindness averse component of the BA-type is rather strong: they are on 
average willing to spend 78 Cents to decrease the other player’s payoff by $1 when behind. 
How do our results relate to the existing literature? Fisman et al. (2007), for example, use step-
shaped budget sets to identify the relative proportions of four different predefined types: they find a 
lexself type (~49% of the subject pool) and a difference averse type (~17%). Their social welfare type 
(~13%) is most similar to our strongly altruistic type, but they find a lower population proportion of this 
type than we do, and their selfish and competitive type (~19%) resembles somewhat our behindness 
averse type.  
Kerschbamer (2015) relies on a piecewise linear model and a design which uses a geometric 
delineation of preferences in the context of a two person dictator game approach. His model allows for 
a translation of his detected type classification into ours. In doing so, we find that out of the 92 subjects 
in his sample of Austrian students, roughly about 30% are moderately altruistic, 32% are strongly 
altruistic, and 5% are behindness averse – indicating that the relative population proportions of these 
three types is remarkably similar to the proportions we found. Kerschbamer’s classification is much 
more flexible than ours but this comes at the cost of lower parsimony, and a classification that is not 
                                                      
22 These numbers are based on the preference parameters of Session 1. The numbers for Session 2 would differ 
slightly but the general thrust of the argument remains the same.  
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unique in all cases, such that the reported population proportions can add up to a total of more than 
100%, depending on what specific classification is used.23  
Another study in this vein is Irriberi & Rey-Biel (2011), who elicit distributional preferences 
with a series of modified three-option dictator games with and without role uncertainty and who also 
use a finite mixture method to assign subjects into four predefined types. Based on their design without 
role uncertainty – which is closer to ours – they find 25% of their subjects to be of the inequity averse 
type. 22% are social welfare types (who resemble our SA-type) and 10% are called competitive (those 
subjects’ behavior corresponds to our BA-type). 44% of their subjects are assigned to the predefined 
selfish type, which – in terms of model parameter distance – is most similar to our weakly altruistic 
type.  
A similar picture emerges in Irriberi & Rey-Biel (2013) where a similar procedure is used. In 
this paper, they compare behavior in situations with social-information about others’ behavior to 
situations without social information. In the latter, which is most similar to our design, they find 15% 
inequity averse types, 14% social welfare types (strongly altruistic in our design), 17% competitive 
types (behindness averse in our design) as well as 54% selfish types. Finally, the study by Andreoni & 
Miller (2002) distinguishes between selfish, Leontief and perfect substitutes preferences. They find 47% 
selfish types.  
Overall, these comparisons illustrate that one important aspect of our endogenous classification 
procedure is the emergence of MA-types. Many previous studies relied on predefined types and applied 
experimental designs less focused on discriminating between purely selfish preferences and moderately 
strong social preferences. This may be the reason why they could not identify the low-cost altruism that 
characterizes our MA-types and labeled these subjects as purely selfish types instead. Overall, however, 
these studies also provided evidence for a substantial fraction of SA-types and a relatively low share of 
BA-types, because these types were contained in the set of predefined types and their identification does 
not rely on an experimental design with specifically high power to discriminate between purely selfish 
preferences and moderately strong social preferences. 
4.3 Stability and fit of the preference types 
One desirable characteristic of a parsimonious distribution of types is that the preferences of the 
different types as well as their shares in the population remain stable over time. We can address this 
issue by comparing the relevant parameter estimates between Sessions 1 and 2. Table 3 depicts the result 
                                                      
23 Kerschbamer (2015) also finds that the behavior of 49% of the subjects is consistent with selfishness, the 
behavior of about 9% is consistent with high inequity aversion, of 11% with low inequity aversion, of 1% with 
spitefulness, and a few remaining subjects can hardly be classified to any of these types. 
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of such comparisons by showing the p-values of various Wald tests for the finite mixture models with 
𝐾𝐾 = 2, 3,  and 𝐾𝐾 = 4  preference types. The first six rows test parameter by parameter whether the 
corresponding estimates remain stable over time for all 𝐾𝐾 types. The last two rows test jointly whether 
the corresponding set of parameter estimates is stable over time for all 𝐾𝐾 types. 
The preference estimates of the finite mixture model with 𝐾𝐾 = 3 types are remarkably stable 
over time. The first five rows of Table 3 reveal that the differences between Sessions 1 and 2 are 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level for the types’ relative shares and all preference parameters 
when tested individually. As in the aggregate model, the estimates for positive reciprocity are the least 
stable, since their difference across sessions exhibits a p-value of 8.9%. By comparison, the differences 
across sessions of the types’ relative shares and all other preference parameters exhibit p-values above 
20%. Furthermore, the results of the joint tests in the last two rows of Table 3 show that, once we exclude 
the estimates for positive reciprocity, the types’ relative shares and the other preference parameters 
remain jointly stable over time.  
--- TABLE 3 --- 
In contrast, the parameter estimates of the models with 𝐾𝐾 = 2  and 𝐾𝐾 = 4  types vary 
significantly over time, both individually and jointly, indicating that these models are misspecified. In 
addition, the model with 𝐾𝐾 = 2 types lacks the flexibility to capture the minority of BA-types (see also 
Table A3 in the appendix), while the model with 𝐾𝐾 = 4 types overfits the data as it tries to isolate a 
second moderately altruistic type that is not stable over time (see also Table A4 in the appendix). Hence, 
the finite mixture model with 𝐾𝐾 = 3 preference types not only represents the best compromise between 
flexibility and parsimony but also yields the most temporally stable characterization of social 
preferences. 
Figure 4 illustrates the temporal stability of the type-specific preference parameters in the 
(𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽) -space. The MA-type’s parameter estimates are represented by squares, the SA-type’s by 
diamonds, and the BA-type’s by triangles. Note that for all three types, even for the very precisely 
estimated MA- and BA-types, the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates of Sessions 1 and 2 
overlap, indicating preference stability at the type level. 
--- FIGURE 4 --- 
Another way to look at the temporal stability of preference types is to analyze how the individual 
classification of subjects into types evolves over time. The finite mixture models we estimate provide 
not only a type-specific characterization of preferences but also posterior probabilities of individual 
type-membership, 𝜏𝜏Wc , for each subject (see equation (7)). Based on these individual posterior 
probabilities of type-membership, we can classify each subject into the type she most likely stems from. 
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The transition matrix shown in Table 4 represents the resulting individual classification of subjects into 
types in Session 1 and 2, respectively. It reveals that the three identified preference types are also fairly 
stable at the individual level: 121/160 = 76% of all subjects are located on the main diagonal and, thus, 
classified into the same preference type in both sessions. The assignment to the preference types is 
particularly stable for the MA- and the SA-types, where 84% and 74%, respectively, are assigned the 
same type in Session 2 as in Session 1. 
--- TABLE 4 --- 
To what extent do the preference parameters estimated in the 𝐾𝐾 = 3 model fit the empirical 
behavior of each of the three types? Figure 5 provides the answer to this question. It displays the 
empirical and predicted type-specific willingness to change the other player’s payoff at different cost 
levels in Session 124. The empirical and predicted willingness follow each other closely and pick up 
behavioral differences between the preference types which the aggregate model cannot explain due to 
its rigidity. The SA-types exhibit the highest willingness for increasing the other player’s payoff, 
regardless of whether they are ahead or behind, and they are almost never willing to reduce the other’s 
payoff. The MA-types, on the other hand, only increase the other player’s payoff if such an increase is 
relatively cheap, and they are also almost never willing to decrease the other’s payoff. Finally, a 
substantial share of BA-types opts for decreasing the other’s payoff, while almost no BA-types are 
willing to increase the other’s payoff.  
--- FIGURE 5 --- 
4.4 Individual preference estimates 
In this subsection, we provide an overview of the individual-specific estimates of the random 
utility model. These estimates capture the full extent of behavioral heterogeneity as they characterize 
each subject by her own vector of parameters, (𝜃𝜃W, 𝜎𝜎W). However, they also consume a lot of degrees of 
freedom and thus may suffer from small sample bias. Moreover, the plethora of individual parameter 
estimates is ill suited for developing parsimonious theoretical models of heterogeneous social 
preferences. 
Table 5 summarizes the individual-specific estimates of the 160 subjects participating in both 
sessions. The summary statistics confirm that, on average, distributional preferences play a more 
important role than motives for reciprocity. In particular, the means and medians of 𝛼𝛼W and 𝛽𝛽W are close 
to the aggregate estimates and indicate that subjects display on average asymmetric altruism. The means 
and medians of the reciprocity parameters, 𝛾𝛾W  and 𝛿𝛿W , exhibit the same signs as their aggregate 
                                                      
24 Figure A5 in the appendix depicts Figure 5’s analogue for Session 2 which is very similar. 
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counterparts but tend to be smaller in absolute values. Moreover, the large standard deviations and 
ranges between the minima and maxima reveal that the individual-specific estimates are highly 
dispersed. 
--- TABLE 5 --- 
The scatter plots in Figure 6 show the distribution of the individual-specific estimates in Session 
1, along with the type-specific estimates of the finite mixture model with 𝐾𝐾 = 3 types.25 The upper panel 
exhibits the distributional parameters, 𝛼𝛼  and 𝛽𝛽 , while the lower panel exhibits the reciprocity 
parameters, 𝛾𝛾 and 𝛿𝛿. The shapes of the individual-specific estimates indicate the classification of the 
underlying subjects into preference types according to the individual posterior probabilities of type-
membership 𝜏𝜏Wc. 
--- FIGURE 6 --- 
These scatter plots reveal that the preference types differ primarily in their distributional 
parameters and exhibit considerable within-type variation. While the individual-specific estimates of 
the distributional parameters visibly bunch around their type-specific counterparts in the upper panel, 
no such bunching is visible for the reciprocity parameters in the lower panel. The considerable within-
type variation could either correspond to some meaningful individual differences in preferences, that 
the type-specific estimates neglect due to their parsimony, or simply reflect noise due to the instability 
and the potential small sample bias of the individual-specific estimates. We explore this question in the 
next section which analyzes the power of the type- and individual-specific estimates at making out-of-
sample predictions across games.  
4.5 The predictive power of preference estimates across games 
In this section, we examine the overall predictive power of the types-specific preferences and 
the individual preferences estimated in Session 2 for two types of games – trust games as well as reward 
and punishment games. Both games are described in more detail below. We compare, in particular, the 
predictions that follow from the type-specific preference estimates of the finite mixture model with (i) 
predictions that are based exclusively on psychological and demographic variables such as personality 
traits, cognitive skills, age, gender, income, and field of study, and (ii) with predictions that are – in 
addition – based on individual-specific preference estimates.26 Because the finite mixture model also 
provides a classification of each individual to one of the three types, and because we know the preference 
                                                      
25 Figure A6 in the appendix depicts Figure 6’s analogue for Session 2 which is qualitatively very similar. 
26 Section 4 of the Online Supplement shows that neither the psychological nor the demographic variables are 
correlated with individual type-membership. 
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parameters of each type, the type-specific model also gives us predictions for each individual. Thus, the 
first comparison informs us whether and how much the preferences estimates of the three type-model 
(together with each individuals’ assignment to one type) increases the power to predict individual 
behavior in other games. The second comparison tells us to what extent the inclusion of further 
individual-specific preference information improves the predictions over the finite mixture model’s 
predictions.  
In addition to predicting the behavioral variation across individuals we are in this section also 
interested in the extent to which the predicted behavioral variation across types is qualitatively similar 
to the actual variation. For example, in the trust game discussed below the MA-types are predicted to 
be more trustworthy than the SA-types. In the reward and punishment games both the MA-types and 
the SA-types should only reward but never punish other players because their estimated negative 
reciprocity parameters are too small to overturn the positive weight they put on the other player’s payoffs 
that follows from the outcome-based social preferences. Likewise, the estimated preferences of the BA-
type imply that this type should not make any positive back-transfers in the trust game and should never 
reward the other player in the reward and punishment games because only her (envious) other-regarding 
preferences in the domain of disadvantageous inequality are significantly different from zero. Yet, 
rewarding a fair action in the reward and punishment games as well as reciprocating trust in the trust 
game requires putting a positive weight on other’s payoff in the domain of advantageous inequality.  
Examining the validity of these qualitative predictions is important. In particular, if the 
qualitative predictions are violated they inform us about potentially relevant behavioral factors that are 
not yet captured by our model. In addition, deviations from the qualitative predictions may provide hints 
about the instability of certain preference components or certain preference types which is also an 
important piece of information. 
4.5.1 Predicting behavior in trust games 
In the ten trust games, shown in Figure 7, player B can refrain from trusting, which yields a 
payoff of (600, 600) or B can trust. In case that player B trusts, player A chooses whether she is 
trustworthy, yielding the payoffs (1200 − 𝑐𝑐, 900), or not trustworthy, resulting in (1200, 0), where 𝑐𝑐 
denotes the cost of being trustworthy. The cost of being trustworthy increase over the ten trust games 
from 0 to 900 in equally sized steps. Player A was asked to indicate his choice for the case that player 
B chooses to trust. Because a trusting move by player B unambiguously increases A’s payoff 
opportunities and thus constitutes an act of kindness, positive reciprocity, 𝛾𝛾, can play a role. In addition, 
depending on the cost of trustworthiness, distributional preferences, 𝛼𝛼 or 𝛽𝛽, can play a role as well. 
Therefore, to predict player A’s choice for a given cost of being trustworthy, we apply the following 
behavioral model that captures the deterministic utilities of the two options, i.e. 
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𝑈𝑈" 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃, 𝑐𝑐 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝛾𝛾 ∗ 1200 − 𝑐𝑐 + (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾) ∗ 900, (10) 
and 
𝑈𝑈" 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡	𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃 = 1 − 𝛽𝛽 − 𝛾𝛾 ∗ 1200. (11) 
Next, we use the random utility model (3) to predict the probability that the subject is trustworthy, 
𝑃𝑃𝛽𝛽 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃, 𝜎𝜎, 𝑐𝑐
=
exp	(𝜎𝜎	𝑈𝑈" 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃, 𝑐𝑐 )
exp(𝜎𝜎	𝑈𝑈" 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃, 𝑐𝑐 ) + exp	(𝜎𝜎	𝑈𝑈" 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡	𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃 )
. 
(12) 
Finally, for the predictions based on the type-specific estimates, we evaluate (12) using the estimates 
from the finite mixture model and each individual’s classification into a type, 
𝑃𝑃𝛽𝛽 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃c, 𝜎𝜎c, 𝑐𝑐 , while for the predictions based on the individual-specific estimates, we 
evaluate (12) using the estimates from the individual estimations, 𝑃𝑃𝛽𝛽 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃W, 𝜎𝜎W, 𝑐𝑐 .  
--- FIGURE 7 --- 
Table 6 shows the results of four OLS regressions of the subjects’ empirical trustworthiness on 
their predicted probability of being trustworthy. In all regressions we control for the above mentioned 
psychological and demographic measures. The first two regressions show that the psychological and 
demographic measures alone explain only 5.9% of the empirical variance in trustworthiness while the 
predictions based on the type-specific estimates increase the explained variance to 34.9%. In this 
regression, the coefficient on the predictions based on the type-specific estimates implies that a 100% 
increase in the predicted trustworthiness increases the actual probability of trustworthiness by 60.7%. 
Moreover, the third regression indicates that only using the individual-specific estimates of all 160 
subjects to predict trustworthiness does not increase the explained variance. Finally, if we use both the 
predictions based on the type-specific estimates and the additional information contained in the 
individual-specific estimates – as indicated by the difference between 𝑃𝑃𝛽𝛽 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃W, 𝜎𝜎W, 𝑐𝑐  and 
𝑃𝑃𝛽𝛽 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦; 𝜃𝜃c, 𝜎𝜎c, 𝑐𝑐  – we are able to explain 37.4% of the variance in trustworthiness (see 
column 4). 27  The significant coefficient on the difference between the predictions based on the 
                                                      
27 The reader may wonder why it is possible that the subject-specific estimates used in regression 3 lead to a 
decrease in 𝑅𝑅É relative to regression 2 while if one uses both the subject-specific and the type-specific information 
(regression 4) there is an increase in 𝑅𝑅É. Denote the total variance in the dependent variable by 𝑉𝑉, the variance 
explained by the type-specific prediction by 𝑉𝑉c and the variance explained by the subject-specific estimates by 
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individual- and the type-specific estimates indicates that the individual-specific estimates capture some 
additional within-type variation in preferences that the type-specific estimates neglect. However, this 
additional within-type variation has only little predictive power and increases the explained variance by 
a mere 2.5 percentage points from 34.9% to 37.4%. 
--- TABLE 6 --- 
Hence, the remarkable implication of Table 6 is that the individual-specific preference estimates 
lead to only very modest improvements in predictive power (in terms of explained variance), suggesting 
that the bulk of the relevant preference information is already contained in the type-specific estimates 
of the finite mixture model. In other words, for predictive purposes a parsimonious model with only 3 
types is almost as good as a model with 160 types. One reason for this result could be that while the 
type-specific estimates tend to average out noise, the individual-specific estimates may have the 
tendency to fit noise. This may be particularly relevant in the context of our discrete choice experiment 
in which the choices could be relatively noisy compared to choices made on a convex budget set. 
How well do the types’ empirical levels of trustworthiness match the predictions based on the 
type-specific estimates? Figure 8 shows that the general pattern in the types’ mean trustworthiness 
matches the predictions well. As predicted, the SA-type is by far the most trustworthy of all three types. 
Its mean trustworthiness starts declining only when the costs of being trustworthy become so high that 
they imply the acceptance of relatively high levels of disadvantageous inequality. In contrast, the MA- 
and BA-type’s mean trustworthiness is not only much lower than the SA-type’s but also declines much 
more rapidly when the costs of being trustworthy increase. 
While this general pattern in the types’ mean trustworthiness matches the predictions well, and 
thus confirms the results from the above regressions, Figure 8 also reveals some important qualitative 
discrepancies. Both the MA- and BA-type are more trustworthy than their type-specific parameter 
estimates imply. They are frequently making trustworthy choices when the costs are low to medium, 
indicating a substantial willingness to reciprocate trust. In particular, the BA-type’s behavior is puzzling. 
The BA-type’s mean trustworthiness closely matches the MA-type’s, although the parameter estimates 
predict that the BA-type should never be trustworthy, unless there is a big enough random error in the 
utility evaluation. 
--- FIGURE 8 --- 
These findings illustrate the limitations of both our model and our estimations. First, they 
highlight that the BA-type’s preferences are unstable, and second, they point us towards a potentially 
                                                      
𝑉𝑉W, with 𝑉𝑉c ⊂ 𝑉𝑉, 𝑉𝑉W ⊂ 𝑉𝑉,	𝑉𝑉c ≠ 𝑉𝑉W. Then the variance explained by combining the subject-specific and the type-
specific predictions, 𝑉𝑉c ∪ 𝑉𝑉W, is larger than both 𝑉𝑉c and 𝑉𝑉W. 
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relevant, yet omitted, factor in our structural model. The instability of the BA-type’s preferences is well 
captured by our estimated empirical model. Table 2 and Figure 4 show that the standard errors of the 
BA-type’s preference parameters are much higher than those of the other types. A particularly striking 
example of this instability are the parameter estimates for positive reciprocity in Session 1: the BA-type 
displays the highest estimate of the reciprocity parameter among all three types but with a standard error 
that is almost 10 times larger than the SA-type’s and almost 5 times larger than the MA-type’s. The 
instability of the BA-type is also reflected in the assignment of individuals to this type. In Session 2, 
84% of the individuals assigned to the SA-type have already been assigned to this type in Session 1; in 
contrast, only 56.5% of the individuals assigned to the BA-type in Session 2 have already been assigned 
to this type in Session 1. 
This instability in preferences also suggests that the BA-type’s behavior reacts sensitively to 
even relatively small contextual changes. One such contextual effect may be the extent to which the 
positive or negative intentions of the first-mover become salient across different games and situations. 
In the case of the trust game, for example, it is very transparent and clear that a trusting move by player 
B signals kind intentions and this clarity may have tilted behindness averse players towards a relatively 
strong reciprocation of trust. One way to include this sensitivity to contextual changes into a structural 
model of social preferences would be to have an extra parameter that explicitly captures and measures 
the perceived kindness of actions such that one is capable of estimating this parameter.  
4.5.2 Predicting behavior in reward and punishment games 
We conducted two reward and punishment games, RP1 and RP2. In these games, a subject in 
the role of player A decides on whether she wants to reward or punish player B for her previous choice. 
In RP1 player B can choose between 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋", 𝑋𝑋- = (600, 600) and 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑌𝑌", 𝑌𝑌- = (300, 900), 
i.e., in the first allocation B sacrifices money to increase A’s payoff while the choice of the second 
allocation can be viewed as an unkind act that favors player B. In RP2 player B can choose between 
𝑋𝑋 = (700, 500) and 𝑌𝑌 = (500, 700); in this case the choice of the first allocation is clearly a kind act 
while choosing the second allocation constitutes a selfish (unkind) act by B. In both games we elicit 
player A’s willingness to reward or punish player B for both of B’s choices. Player A can pay 10, 20 or 
30 to reward B, which increases B’s payoff by 100, 200 or 300, respectively. But A can also pay 10, 
20 or 30 to punish B, which decreases B’s payoff by 100, 200 or 300, respectively. Finally, A may 
also decide to neither reward or punish B.28  
To assess the quantitative predictive power of the type-specific and individual preference 
estimates in RP1 and RP2 we calculate how much a subject is willing to spend on rewarding or punishing 
player B in response to the kind choice, 𝑋𝑋, and the unkind choice, 𝑌𝑌. Note that in both games the 
                                                      
28 The experimental instructions used neutral wording, i.e., terms such as “punishment” or “reward” were avoided.  
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parameters for outcome-based and the reciprocity-based social preferences can play a role. Therefore, 
if the subject spends 𝑡𝑡 on rewarding player B for choosing allocation 𝐶𝐶	𝜖𝜖	{𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌} her utility is 
𝑈𝑈" 𝑡𝑡; 𝜃𝜃 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∗ (𝐶𝐶" − 𝑡𝑡) + (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿) ∗ (𝐶𝐶- + 10𝑡𝑡). (13) 
On the other hand, if the subject spends 𝑝𝑝 on punishing player B her utility is 
𝑈𝑈" 𝑝𝑝; 𝜃𝜃 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∗ (𝐶𝐶" − 𝑝𝑝) + (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿) ∗ (𝐶𝐶- − 10𝑝𝑝). (14) 
Finally, if the subject neither rewards nor punishes player B she obtains a utility of 
𝑈𝑈" 0; 𝜃𝜃 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∗ 𝐶𝐶" + (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿) ∗ 𝐶𝐶-. (15) 
We apply the random utility model (3) to predict the probability of each reward and punishment 
level the subject can choose from based on the finite mixture model’s classification into a type and the 
type-specific estimates, (𝜃𝜃c, 𝜎𝜎c), as well as the individual-specific estimates, (𝜃𝜃W, 𝜎𝜎W). Subsequently, we 
use these probabilities for computing the expected reward/punishment levels which we then use as 
regressors to explain the actual reward/punishment levels.  
Table 7 shows four OLS regressions of the actual on the expected reward and punishment levels. 
The first regression shows that psychological and demographic measures explain only 3.5% of the 
variance while the second regression indicates that predictions based on the type-specific preference 
estimates increase the explained variance to 26.7%. Moreover, the third regression indicates that using 
the individual-specific estimates of all 160 subjects to predict behavior even decreases the 𝑅𝑅É slightly. 
Finally, the explained variance rises to 30.2% when we use both the predictions based on the type-
specific estimates as well as the difference between the predictions based on the individual- and the 
type-specific estimates. As in the trust games, the significant coefficient on the difference between the 
predictions based on the individual- and the type-specific estimates indicates that the individual-specific 
estimates capture some additional within-type variation in preferences that the more parsimonious type-
specific estimates neglect. However, this additional within-type variation does not lead to any major 
improvements in predictive power, as it rises the share of the explained variance by just 3.5 percentage 
points compared to the regression that only uses the type-specific estimates to predict behavior. 
--- TABLE 7 --- 
In sum, the results of Table 7 reinforce one of the main conclusions from Table 6 – the bulk of 
the relevant preference information is already contained in the type-specific estimates of the finite 
mixture model. The explained variance of the predictions based on the individual-specific estimates 
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(column 3) is even lower compared to the ones based on the type-specific estimates, suggesting that the 
individual-specific estimates are very noisy and may suffer from small sample bias. Again, this may be 
due to the nature of our discrete choice experiment which may lead to noisier data than an experiment 
in which the subjects choose form a convex budget set. 
To what extent is the observed behavioral variation across types qualitatively similar to the 
predicted variation? We can answer this question with the help of Figure 9 which shows player A’s 
mean reward and punishment behavior in RP1 and RP2 (with 95% confidence intervals) in response to 
player B’s choice as well the predicted mean reward and punishment (indicated by the plus signs). 
The type-specific parameter estimates predict that the BA-type is the only type that should 
punish in both games (RP1 and RP2) regardless of whether player B takes a kind or an unkind prior 
move. Figure 9 shows that this prediction is partially borne out by the data: the BA-type is clearly the 
most punitive among the three types but significant punishment only emerges after an unkind move. 
According to our estimates, the SA-type should be more willing to reward than the MA-type – a 
prediction that also is met by the data. However, our type-specific estimates also imply that the SA- and 
the MA-types never punish the other player because their coefficient for negative reciprocity is far too 
small to compensate the positive weight they put on the other player’s payoff in the domain of 
disadvantageous inequality. 
--- FIGURE 9 --- 
In contrast to this prediction, we observe that the SA- and MA-type both punish player B for 
choosing the unkind allocation 𝑌𝑌. In our view this behavior again points towards the instability of 
reciprocal behaviors across various games and situations. Because reciprocity critically depends on 
inferences about the kindness or hostility of the other players’ actions, instability in kindness/hostility 
perceptions across games may give rise to instability in reciprocal behaviors. For example, in RP1 an 
offer of (300, 900)  is saliently unfair because the equal split of (600, 600)  is available; it seems 
plausible that such saliently unfair actions may magnify negative reciprocity concerns and lead to higher 
than predicted punishment relative to other games in which unfairness is less salient. From an empirical 
perspective, this points towards the necessity to identify the levels and the determinants of subjects’ 
kindness and hostility perceptions, because if we get an empirical grip on these perceptions, we may be 
able to explain the variation in the strengths of reciprocity across games. These perceptions could also 
be incorporated into an extended version of our structural model. Another option to improve the 
predictive power of the model could be to extend the model towards taking nonlinearities in the reaction 
to kind and unkind prior acts into account.  
Taken together, the out-of-sample predictions discussed in this section are provide insights into 
the power and the limitations of our model. First, our model with only three other-regarding types 
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contains the bulk of the preference information that can be used to explain the behavioral variation 
across subjects. In fact, the predictions based on the type-specific estimates already explain a substantial 
fraction of the behavioral variation across individuals, while the additional information contained in the 
individual-specific estimates of all 160 subjects lead to only very modest further improvements in out-
of-sample predictions. This insight may be particularly relevant in practical applications where 
collecting enough data per subject for reliable individual level estimates is often infeasible. 
Second, the predicted behavioral variation across types is by and large qualitatively met by the 
types’ actual behavioral variation. In particular, in the reward and punishment games, the strength of 
reward is highest among individuals in the SA-type and lowest among those in the BA-type, while the 
willingness to punish is highest among individuals in the BA-type and lowest among those in the SA-
type.  
Third, however, in situations that likely render perceptions of kindness or hostility very salient 
our type-specific estimates fail to predict actually occurring rewarding and punishing behavior in other 
games. Our out-of-sample predictions thus point towards a key problem in the empirical application of 
reciprocity models. We conjecture that the accurate prediction of the strength of reciprocity motives 
across games requires the explicit empirical identification of the strength of kindness and hostility 
perceptions. Thus, to the extent that these perceptions vary across games this variation needs to be 
measured and explained.  
Finally, the findings illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 reinforce the conclusion that purely selfish 
behavior is sufficiently rare such that no independent selfish type emerges in a parsimonious model of 
social preference types. If the cost of other-regarding behavior becomes low, most people generally 
seem to be willing to increase or decrease the other player’s payoff to some degree. In Figure 8, for 
example, we find very high levels of trustworthiness even among the individuals in the MA- and the 
BA-type when costs are low. Likewise, there are significant levels of average punishment among all 
three preference types in the reward and punishment games. 
5 Conclusion 
The analysis in this paper combines an experimental design with a flexible structural model to 
uncover the distribution and stability of social preferences. It yields several main conclusions. First, 
purely selfish behavior seems to be the exception rather than the rule, i.e. once the costs of altering the 
other player’s payoff are low, selfish behavior is very rare and the vast majority of individuals exhibits 
some sort of social preferences. Second, the distribution of social preferences can be characterized in a 
parsimonious way by three temporally stable preference types: a moderately altruistic type that makes 
up roughly 50% of the population, a strongly altruistic type that constitutes 40% of the population, and 
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a behindness averse type that accounts for roughly 10% of the population. Third, this parsimonious 
characterization of the distribution of social preferences is not only stable over time but also exhibits 
considerable power in making out-of-sample predictions across games. In particular, the type-specific 
preference estimates combined with the classification of subjects into types explain a substantial fraction 
of behavioral variation in additional games. In fact, they are virtually as good in making out-of-sample 
predictions across games as the individual preference estimates, suggesting that the individual 
preference estimates are noisy and may suffer from small sample bias. Finally, preferences for 
reciprocity seem to be less important and less stable than distributional preferences, and there is little 
evidence that preferences for negative reciprocity are stronger than preferences for positive reciprocity. 
However, some caveats are in order here. We identify the preference types in a non-
representative subject pool of university students and on the basis of (i) decisions in binary games and 
(ii) a piecewise linear model of social preferences. This has potentially important implications. First, the 
finding that reciprocal motives turn out to be relatively minor compared to distributional ones may not 
be generalizable to other games, frames and institutional arrangements where kindness and/or hostility 
perceptions may play a more prominent role. Second, the result that there are essentially no types that 
simultaneously dislike advantageous and disadvantageous inequality may be specific to the student 
subject pool and/or the binary dictator games we used here. For instance, Bellemare et al. (2008) found 
in a representative sample of the Dutch population that young and well educated subjects tend to be 
considerably less inequality averse than the average. Moreover, in our dictator games, the subjects 
always had to choose between two unequal allocations and could never implement an equal payoff 
distribution between themselves and the other player – a situation that has been shown to substantially 
increase the prevalence of unfair behaviors (Güth, Huck and Müller 2001).29 Thus, in a bigger sample 
with a large heterogeneous population, we may find more evidence for inequality aversion, especially 
if the subjects can also implement equal payoff distributions (see Kerschbamer and Müller (2017)). 
Third, while our out-of-sample analyses demonstrate the power of the type-specific estimates to predict 
behavior in situations that differ from our binary choice task, they also highlighted the limitations of the 
model in predicting behavior in situations that are more complex and differ in important ways from the 
situations in our binary choice task. 
We see three central avenues for future research. First, the methodology presented in this paper 
can be applied to representative subject pools to learn more about the distribution of social preferences 
types in the general population and in specific cultural contexts. Second, as already outlined, our results 
                                                      
29 For example, if proposers in a mini-ultimatum game have the choice between the allocation (10, 10) and (17, 3) 
71 percent of the proposers chose the equal split. In contrast, if the equal split in this choice set is replaced by a 
slightly disadvantageous offer for the proposer that is close to the equal split such that the choice is now between 
(9, 11) and (17, 3), only 33% of the proposers chose the (9,11) allocation.  
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may prove useful for both developing theoretical models that explicitly incorporate social preference 
heterogeneity in a parsimonious way. Third, it may be interesting to use type-specific estimates of 
preference parameters in representative subject pools to predict and explain people’s political views, 
their voting behaviors or their behaviors in organizations and labor markets. Fourth, our experimental 
design was specifically chosen to inform a linear model of social preferences. The experimental design 
and the preference model could be extended to capture nonlinearities in social preferences. Finally, 
future structural models might consider taking nonlinearities in the reaction to (un)kind acts as well as 
the perceptions about (un)kindness explicitly into account. While these extensions would probably lead 
to progress in predicting heterogeneity in other-regarding behaviors, they come at the cost of a more 
complex experimental design and a less parsimonious model.  
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Tables 
 
 Estimates of 
Session 1 
Estimates of 
Session 2 
p-value of z-test with  
H0: Session1=Session2 
a: Weight on other’s payoff  0.083*** 0.098*** 0.468 
when behind (0.015) (0.013)  
b: Weight on other’s payoff 0.261*** 0.245*** 0.551 
when ahead (0.019) (0.019)  
g: Measure of positive 0.072*** 0.029*** 0.010 
reciprocity (0.014) (0.010)  
d: Measure of negative -0.042*** -0.043*** 0.918 
reciprocity (0.011) (0.008)  
s: Choice sensitivity 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001)  
# of observations 18,720 18,720  
# of subjects 160 160  
Log Likelihood -5,472.31 -4,540.74  
Individual cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Table 1: Estimated preferences of the representative agent (𝐾𝐾 = 1) in Sessions 1 and 2. 
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 Strongly 
Altruistic 
Type 
Moderately 
Altruistic 
Type 
Behindness 
Averse 
Type 
Session 1    
p: Types’ shares in the 0.405*** 0.474*** 0.121*** 
population (0.047) (0.042) (0.039) 
a: Weight on other’s payoff 0.159*** 0.065*** -0.437*** 
when behind (0.036) (0.013) (0.130) 
b: Weight on other’s payoff 0.463*** 0.130*** -0.147 
when ahead (0.028) (0.017) (0.147) 
g: Measure of positive 0.151*** -0.001 0.170 
reciprocity (0.026) (0.012) (0.119) 
d: Measure of negative -0.053** -0.027** -0.077 
reciprocity (0.025) (0.012) (0.162) 
s: Choice sensitivity 0.018*** 0.032*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Session 2    
p: Types’ shares in the 0.356*** 0.544*** 0.100*** 
population (0.039) (0.041) (0.024) 
a: Weight on other’s payoff 0.193*** 0.061*** -0.328*** 
when behind (0.019) (0.009) (0.073) 
b: Weight on other’s payoff 0.494*** 0.095*** -0.048 
when ahead (0.020) (0.012) (0.053) 
g: Effect of positive 0.099*** -0.005 -0.028 
reciprocity (0.024) (0.006) (0.030) 
d: Effect of negative -0.082*** -0.019*** -0.015 
reciprocity (0.018) (0.007) (0.035) 
s: Choice sensitivity 0.019*** 0.049*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
# of observations (both sessions) 18,720 
160 
-4,202.17 
-3,166.32 
# of subjects (both sessions) 
Log Likelihood in Session 1 
Log Likelihood in Session 2 
Individual cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 10% 
 
Table 2: Finite mixture estimations (𝐾𝐾 = 3) in Sessions 1 and 2. 
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 Stable under H0  p-value in Model 
Null hypothesis H0: 𝜋𝜋c 𝛼𝛼c 𝛽𝛽c 𝛾𝛾c 𝛿𝛿c 𝜎𝜎c  𝐾𝐾 = 2 𝐾𝐾 = 3 𝐾𝐾 = 4 
Types’ shares are stable x       0.067 0.498 <0.001 
Weights on other’s payoff when 
behind are stable  x     
 <0.001 0.762 <0.001 
Weights on other’s payoff when 
ahead are stable   x    
 <0.001 0.208 <0.001 
Positive reciprocity parameters are 
stable    x   
 <0.001 0.089 <0.001 
Negative reciprocity parameters are 
stable     x  
 0.010 0.765 0.810 
Choice sensitivity parameters are 
stable      x 
 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 
All preference parameters & types’ 
shares are stable x x x x x  
 <0.001 0.009 <0.001 
All pref. pars. & types’ rel. sizes 
excl. positive reciprocity are stable x x x  x  
 <0.001 0.490 <0.001 
 
Table 3: Wald tests for the stability of parameter estimates over time, i.e. over Sessions 1 and 2. 
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  Session 2 
  Moderately 
Altruistic 
Strongly  
Altruistic 
Behindness 
Averse 
Se
ss
io
n 
1 
Moderately Altruistic 
(N=76) 
64 (84 %) 7 (9%) 5 (7%) 
Strongly Altruistic 
(N=65) 
15 (23%) 48 (74%) 2 (3%) 
Behindness Averse 
(N=19) 
8 (42%) 2 (11%) 9 (47%) 
 
Table 4: Individual type-membership in Sessions 1 and 2. The numbers in parentheses indicate the 
subjects’ transitions from Session 1 to Session 2 as a percentage of the original preference type in 
Session 1. Subjects are classified into preference types according to the individual probabilities of type-
membership (see Section 3.3) that are derived from the finite mixture estimations with 𝐾𝐾 = 3 preference 
types. 
 
 
 Median Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Session 1      
a: Weight on other’s payoff when behind 0.054 0.018 0.285 -1.394 0.471 
b: Weight on other’s payoff when ahead 0.211 0.216 0.328 -1.977 0.998 
g: Measure of positive reciprocity 0.043 0.082 0.205 -0.366 0.783 
d: Measure of negative reciprocity -0.010 -0.056 0.196 -1.106 0.598 
s: Choice sensitivity 0.035 0.168 0.248 0.004 0.847 
      
Session 2      
a: Weight on other’s payoff when behind 0.060 0.048 0.236 -1.636 0.401 
b: Weight on other’s payoff when ahead 0.169 0.225 0.248 -0.405 0.905 
g: Measure of positive reciprocity 0.000 0.030 0.166 -1.087 0.679 
d: Measure of negative reciprocity -0.010 -0.045 0.119 -0.553 0.229 
s: Choice sensitivity 0.069 0.269 0.278 0.007 0.886 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics of individual parameter estimates in Sessions 1 and 2.  
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OLS regression with dependent variable: trustworthy [0/1] 
Intercept 0.392 0.233 0.228 0.215 
 (0.294) (0.210) (0.191) (0.196) 
Prediction based on  0.607***  0.650*** 
type-specific estimates  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Prediction based on   0.577***  
individual-specific estimates   (0.031)  
Difference between predictions based on     0.300*** 
individual- and type-specific estimates    (0.053) 
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes 
# of observations 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 
# of subjects 160 160 160 160 
R2 0.059 0.349 0.343 0.374 
Additional control variables include: Big 5 personality traits, cognitive ability, age, gender, monthly 
income, and field of study. Individual cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Table 6: Predictive power of preference estimates in the trust games.  
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OLS regression with dependent variable: Reward / Punishment 
Intercept 59.976 -13.644 -31.029 -36.756 
 (87.566) (68.128) (63.755) (62.194) 
Prediction based on  1.123***  1.065*** 
type-specific estimates  (0.089)  (0.084) 
Prediction based on   0.637***  
individual-specific estimates   (0.052)  
Difference between predictions based on     -0.348*** 
individual- and type-specific estimates    (0.074) 
Additional control variables yes yes yes yes 
# of observations 640 640 640 640 
# of subjects 160 160 160 160 
R2 0.035 0.267 0.251 0.302 
Additional control variables include: Big 5 personality traits, cognitive ability, age, gender, monthly 
income, and field of study. Individual cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 7: Predictive power of preference estimates in the reward and punishment games.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: The dictator games. Each of the three circles contains 13 binary dictator games. Each game 
is represented by the two payoff allocations connected by a line. Player A can choose one of the extreme 
points on the line. For every game, the slope of the line indicates A’s cost of altering player B’s payoff. 
Allocations above (below) the dashed 45° line help identifying the weight player A puts on B’s payoff 
under disadvantageous (advantageous) inequality.  
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Figure 2: Representative agent’s empirical and predicted willingness to change the other player’s payoff 
across cost levels in Session 1. The empirical willingness corresponds to the fraction of subjects that 
chose to change the other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. The predicted willingness 
corresponds to the predicted probability that the representative agent changes the other player’s payoff 
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in the indicated direction. It is based on the random utility model presented in Section 3.1 and uses the 
estimated aggregate parameters of Session 1 on all dictator and reciprocity games.  
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Figure 3: Normalized entropy criterion (NEC) for different numbers of preference types in Sessions 1 
and 2. The NEC summarizes the ambiguity in the subjects’ classification into types relative to the finite 
mixture model’s improvement in fit compared to the representative agent model with K = 1 (see 
equations 8 and 9). By minimizing the NEC, we can determine the optimal number of preference types 
𝐾𝐾 the finite mixture model should take into account. 
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Figure 4: Temporal stability of the type-specific parameter estimates of the finite mixture models with 
𝐾𝐾 = 3  preference types. The type-specific parameter estimates are stable over time as their 95% 
confidence intervals overlap between Session 1 and 2.  
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Figure 5: Empirical and predicted willingness to change the other player’s payoff of the different 
preference types across cost levels in Session 1. The empirical willingness corresponds to the fraction 
of subjects of a given preference type that chose to change the other player’s payoff in the indicated 
direction. The predicted willingness corresponds to the predicted probability that a given preference 
type changes the other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. It is based on the random utility model 
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presented in Section 3.1 and uses the estimated type-specific parameters of Session 1 on all dictator and 
reciprocity games.  
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Figure 6: Distribution of individual-specific parameter estimates along with type-specific parameter 
estimates (𝐾𝐾 = 3 model) in Session 1. The shapes of the individual-specific estimates indicate the 
underlying subjects’ classification into preference types according to the individual posterior 
probabilities of type-membership (see equation (7)): the Moderately Altruistic (MA) Types are 
represented by squares, the Strongly Altruistic (SA) Types by diamonds, and the Behindness Averse 
(BA) Types by triangles. 
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Figure 7: The ten trust games with varying costs of being trustworthy. 
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Figure 8: Empirical and predicted mean trustworthiness of the different preference types across cost 
levels (with 95% confidence intervals). The empirical mean trustworthiness corresponds to the fraction 
of subjects of a preference type that chose the trustworthy action at a given cost of being trustworthy. 
The predicted trustworthiness corresponds to the predicted probability that a subject of a given 
preference type chooses the trustworthy action at a given cost of being trustworthy. The predicted 
probability is based on the random utility model presented in Section 3.1 and uses the estimated type-
specific parameters of Session 2. 
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Figure 9: Empirical and predicted mean reward and punishment of player A in response to player B’s 
choice (with 95% confidence intervals). The bars correspond to the mean reward or punishment level 
the subjects of a given preference type implement in response to player B’s choice. The plus signs 
correspond to the reward or punishment level a subject of a given preference type is predicted to 
implement in response to player B’s choice. The prediction is based on the random utility model 
presented in Section 3.1 and uses the estimated type-specific parameters of Session 2. 
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Appendix 
A1 Screenshots 
Dictator Game (translated from German): 
 
Figure A1: Screenshot of a dictator game. Choice by player A.  
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Reciprocity Game (translated from German): 
 
Figure A2: Screenshot of a reciprocity game. Choice by player A.  
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A2 Potential of reciprocity games to trigger the sensation of having been 
treated kindly or or unkindly by the other player 
Allocation 𝑋𝑋 
(Π:", Π:-) 
Allocation 𝑌𝑌 
(Π=", Π=-) 
Allocation 𝑍𝑍 
(Π@", Π@-) 
Average 
Kindness Rating 
 
Std. Err. 
(470, 730) (190, 1010) (610, 590) 2.087 0.065 
(520, 870) (140, 870) (660, 730) 2.294 0.063 
(450, 1020) (210, 720) (590, 880) 2.306 0.058 
(790, 600) (410, 600) (930, 460) 2.375 0.061 
(740, 460) (460, 740) (880, 320) 2.487 0.059 
(720, 750) (480, 450) (860, 610) 2.669 0.061 
(1060, 330) (680, 330) (1200, 190) 2.712 0.064 
(990, 480) (750, 180) (1130, 340) 2.725 0.061 
(1010, 190) (730, 470) (1150, 50) 2.831 0.060 
(450, 1020) (210, 720) (70, 860) 3.825 0.063 
(720, 750) (480, 450) (340, 590) 3.888 0.061 
(990, 480) (750, 180) (610, 320) 3.888 0.059 
(790, 600) (410, 600) (270, 740) 4.725 0.045 
(1060, 330) (680, 330) (540, 470) 4.763 0.051 
(470, 730) (190, 1010) (50, 1150) 4.763 0.044 
(520, 870) (140, 870) (0, 1010) 4.794 0.050 
(740, 460) (460, 740) (320, 880) 4.800 0.046 
(1010, 190) (730, 470) (590, 610) 4.831 0.039 
 
Table A1: Kindness rating if player B forgoes allocation 𝑍𝑍 and leaves player A the choice between 
allocations 𝑋𝑋 and	𝑌𝑌. (1=very unkind; 5=very kind) 
 
Table A1 allows to check the potential of the reciprocity games for triggering reciprocal actions. 
It shows for a sample of 18 reciprocity games, how subjects in the role of player A on average rated 
player B’s kindness when player B forgoes allocation 𝑍𝑍 and gives them the choice between allocations 
𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌. Subjects had to rate player B’s kindness on a 5-point scale form 1 (very unkind) to 5 (very 
kind)  
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A3 No evidence of attrition bias 
 Subjects  
participating 
in Session 1 & 2 
(N=160) 
All Subjects  
participating  
in Session 1 
(N=183) 
p-value of z-test  
with H0: Equal  
estimates in 
columns 1 & 2 
a: Weight on other’s payoff 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.699 
when behind (0.015) (0.014)  
b: Weight on other’s payoff 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.984 
when ahead (0.019) (0.018)  
g: Measure of positive 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.916 
reciprocity (0.014) (0.012)  
d: Measure of negative -0.042*** -0.036*** 0.723 
reciprocity (0.011) (0.010)  
s: Choice sensitivity 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.862 
 (0.001) (0.001)  
# of observations 18,720 21,411  
# of subjects 160 183  
Log Likelihood -5,472.31 -6,332.84  
Individual cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Subjects with inconsistent choices and at least one estimated preference parameter outside the 
identifiable range of -3 to 1 are dropped. 
 
Table A2: No evidence of attrition bias.  
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A4 Willingness to change the other’s payoff in Session 2 (𝑲𝑲 = 𝟏𝟏 model) 
 
Figure A3: Representative agent’s empirical and predicted willingness to change the other player’s 
payoff across cost levels in Session 2. The empirical willingness corresponds to the fraction of subjects 
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that chose to change the other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. The predicted willingness 
corresponds to the predicted probability that the representative agent choses to change the other player’s 
payoff in the indicated direction. It is based on the random utility model presented in Section 3.1 and 
uses the estimated aggregate parameters of Session 2 on all dictator and reciprocity games.  
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A5 Finite mixture model with 𝑲𝑲 = 𝟐𝟐 preference types 
 Social Welfare 
Type I 
Social Welfare 
Type II 
Session 1   
p: Types’ shares in the 0.477*** 0.523*** 
population (0.049) (0.049) 
a: Weight on other’s payoff 0.061*** 0.085*** 
when behind (0.015) (0.030) 
b: Weight on other’s payoff 0.122*** 0.370*** 
when ahead (0.023) (0.027) 
g: Measure of positive 0.000 0.141*** 
reciprocity (0.011) (0.023) 
d: Measure of negative -0.026** -0.055*** 
reciprocity (0.012) (0.019) 
s: Choice sensitivity 0.032*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
   
Session 2   
p: Types’ shares in the 0.638*** 0.362*** 
population (0.039) (0.039) 
a: Weight on other’s payoff 0.033** 0.188*** 
when behind (0.013) (0.019) 
b: Weight on other’s payoff 0.089*** 0.493*** 
when ahead (0.012) (0.020) 
g: Measure of positive -0.008 0.098*** 
reciprocity (0.007) (0.023) 
d: Measure of negative -0.021*** -0.080*** 
reciprocity (0.007) (0.018) 
s: Choice sensitivity 0.028*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
# of observations (both sessions) 18,720 
# of subjects (both sessions) 160 
Log Likelihood in Session 1 -4,920.77 
Log Likelihood in Session 2 -3,689.26 
 
Table A3: Finite mixture estimations (𝐾𝐾 = 2) in Sessions 1 and 2.  
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A6 Finite mixture model with 𝑲𝑲 = 𝟒𝟒 preference types 
 Strongly 
Altruistic 
Type  
Moderately 
Altruistic 
Type I  
Moderately 
Altruistic 
Type II 
Behindness 
Averse 
Type 
Session 1     
p: Types’ shares in the 0.360*** 0.367*** 0.170*** 0.103*** 
population (0.054) (0.045) (0.035) (0.033) 
a: Weight on other’s payoff 0.180*** 0.056* 0.057*** -0.558** 
when behind (0.023) (0.028) (0.017) (0.223) 
b: Weight on other’s payoff 0.484*** 0.178*** 0.072*** -0.207 
when ahead (0.031) (0.040) (0.012) (0.139) 
g: Measure of positive 0.150*** 0.022 -0.003 0.211 
reciprocity (0.026) (0.023) (0.011) (0.140) 
d: Measure of negative -0.060*** -0.032 -0.020 -0.071 
reciprocity (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.123) 
s: Choice sensitivity 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.139*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.034) (0.002) 
     
Session 2     
p: Types’ shares in the 0.342*** 0.313*** 0.245*** 0.100*** 
population (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.024) 
a: Weight on other’s payoff 0.193*** 0.097*** 0.026*** -0.329*** 
when behind (0.019) (0.013) (0.007) (0.073) 
b: Weight on other’s payoff 0.503*** 0.168*** 0.033*** -0.048 
when ahead (0.019) (0.015) (0.010) (0.053) 
g: Measure of positive 0.103*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.028 
reciprocity (0.023) (0.012) (0.005) (0.030) 
d: Measure of negative -0.081*** -0.034*** -0.009 -0.015 
reciprocity (0.019) (0.012) (0.006) (0.035) 
s: Choice sensitivity 0.019*** 0.039*** 0.109*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) 
# of observation (both sessions) 18,720  
# of subjects (both sessions) 160  
Log Likelihood in Session 1 -4,039.43  
Log Likelihood in Session 2 -3,016.26  
Individual cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
 
Table A4: Finite mixture estimations (𝐾𝐾 = 4) in Sessions 1 and 2.  
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A7 Distribution of posterior probabilities of individual type-membership 
The finite mixture method we used not only provides a characterization of the preferences of 
each type but also provides posterior probabilities of type-membership for each individual (see equation 
(7)). A good model assigns individuals unambiguously to one of the preference types in the sense that 
the probability of belonging to that type is close to 1, and close to 0 for all other types. The upper and 
lower panels in Figure A4 show the distribution of the posterior probabilities of individual type-
membership in Sessions 1 and 2, respectively. The histograms reveal that there are almost no interior 
probabilities of individual type-membership suggesting that almost all subjects are unambiguously 
assigned to one of the three types. 
 
 
Figure A4: Distribution of posterior probabilities of individual type-membership in  
Sessions 1 (upper row) and 2 (lower row). 
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A8 Willingness to change the other’s payoff in Session 2 (𝑲𝑲 = 𝟑𝟑 model) 
 
Figure A5: Empirical and predicted willingness of the different preference types to change the other 
player’s payoff across cost levels in Session 2. The empirical willingness corresponds to the fraction of 
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subjects of a given preference type that chose to change the other player’s payoff in the indicated 
direction. The predicted willingness corresponds to the predicted probability that a given preference 
type changes the other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. It is based on the random utility model 
presented in Section 3.1 and uses the estimated type-specific parameters of Session 2 on all dictator and 
reciprocity games.  
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A9 Distribution of individual-specific parameter estimates in Session 2 
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Figure A6: Distribution of individual-specific parameter estimates along with type-specific parameter 
estimates (𝐾𝐾 = 3 model) in Session 2. The shapes of the individual-specific estimates indicate the 
underlying subjects’ classification into preference types according to the individual posterior 
probabilities of type-membership (see equation (7)): the Moderately Altruistic (MA) Types are 
represented by squares, the Strongly Altruistic (SA) Types by diamonds, and the Behindness Averse 
(BA) Types by triangles. 
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1 Monte Carlo simulations: Parameter recovery and impact of 
serially correlated errors in the aggregate model 
This section presents the set-up and the results of a series of four Monte Carlo simulations in the context 
of the aggregate model. These Monte Carlo simulations serve two main goals: (i) to check whether the 
experimental design and the econometric strategy allow us to reliably recover the parameters of the 
behavioral model; and (ii) to assess the extent to which a potential misspecification due to serially 
correlated errors across games can bias our results. 
1.1 Set-up 
All four Monte Carlo simulations have an analogous set-up. First, we define a vector 𝜓𝜓 = 	 (𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾, 𝛿𝛿, 𝜎𝜎) 
containing the true parameters of the behavioral model and the choice sensitivity. The below table 
shows the true parameters for each of the four Monte Carlo simulations. 
 True parameters 
Simulation 𝛼𝛼 𝛽𝛽 𝛾𝛾 𝛿𝛿 𝜎𝜎 
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
2 0.20 0.50 0.15 -0.10 0.01 
3 0.05 0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.01 
4 -0.35 0.00 0.10 -0.05 0.01 
 
The true parameters of Simulation 1 reflect completely selfish behavior. In contrast, the true parameters 
of Simulations 2, 3, and 4 correspond roughly to the parameter estimates of the SA-, MA-, and BA-
type, respectively. The choice sensitivity 𝜎𝜎 is equal to 0.01 in all four simulations, implying a somewhat 
higher decision noise than estimated in the paper. 
After defining the true parameters, we execute 𝑅𝑅 = 1,000 simulation runs for each of the four 
simulations. Each simulation run 𝑟𝑟 consists of two steps: 
a) In the first step, we simulate the choices of 𝑁𝑁 ∈ 1,20,160  subjects in the 117 dictator and 
reciprocity games based on the true parameters and the random utility model presented in 
section 3.1 of the paper. 
Varying the number of subjects allows us to investigate how 𝑁𝑁 affects the potential bias and 
the overall accuracy of our estimations: 𝑁𝑁 = 1 corresponds to the amount of data available in 
the individual estimations; 𝑁𝑁 = 20 roughly corresponds to the number of subjects classified as 
BA-types – the smallest preference type that the finite mixture model identifies; and 𝑁𝑁 = 160 
corresponds to the total number of subjects that we use in the estimations in the paper. 
We also intend to assess the extent to which a potential misspecification due to serially 
correlated errors across games can bias our results. Therefore, the simulated random errors in 
a subject’s utility follow an AR(1) process across games with serial correlation 𝜌𝜌 ∈
	{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8} and type-1-extreme-value-distributed innovations. If 𝜌𝜌 = 0, there is no 
serial correlation in the errors and the random utility model in section 3.1 is specified correctly. 
However, if 𝜌𝜌 > 0, the errors are serially correlated across games and the model is 
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misspecified, potentially leading to a biased estimator. Moreover, the order of games within the 
blocks of dictator and reciprocity games is randomly reshuffled in each simulation run. This 
random reshuffling takes into account that in the experiment, the games were presented in 
random order within the blocks of dictator and reciprocity games (see section 2.3 in the paper). 
b) In the second step, we try to recover the true parameters by estimating the random utility model 
on the simulated choices. This yields a vector of estimated parameters 𝜓𝜓(;) for each simulation 
run 𝑟𝑟. 
After finishing all 𝑅𝑅 simulation runs, we compare the true and the estimated parameters to assess the 
potential bias and the overall accuracy of our estimators. The bias in the estimator of parameter 𝑗𝑗, 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠(𝜓𝜓A) =
1
𝑅𝑅
𝜓𝜓A
; − 𝜓𝜓A
C
;DE
, (S1) 
indicates whether, on average, we can recover the true parameter, or whether the estimated parameter 
systematically deviates from the true value. The overall accuracy of the estimator is given by its Mean 
Squared Error (MSE), 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝜓𝜓A) = 	𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠(𝜓𝜓A)
I + 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟(𝜓𝜓A) =
1
𝑅𝑅
𝜓𝜓A
; − 𝜓𝜓A
I
C
;DE
, (S2) 
and corresponds to the sum of the estimator’s squared bias plus its variance – an inverse measure for 
its precision. A MSE close to zero indicates great overall accuracy, while a large MSE indicates a low 
overall accuracy due to a bias in the estimator and/or a high variance. Considering the overall accuracy 
and not just bias is particularly important when performing horse races between different estimators, as 
a biased estimator with a relatively low variance may be overall more accurate than an unbiased 
estimator with a relatively high variance. 
1.2 Results 
Tables S1 to S4 summarize the results in terms of bias and overall accuracy, while Figures S1 to S4 
visualize the bias in the estimators.  
The results are qualitatively identical across all four Monte Carlo simulations. For the estimators of the 
behavioral model’s parameters, 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾, and 𝛿𝛿, the results can be summarized as follows: 
• If there is no serial correlation in the errors, i.e. 𝜌𝜌 = 0, the bias is negligible in absolute value 
for estimations with 𝑁𝑁 = 1 subject and approaches zero for estimations with 𝑁𝑁 = 20 and 𝑁𝑁 =
160 subjects. Hence, even estimations at the individual level allow us to on average recover 
the true parameters of the behavioral model. However, the MSEs reveal that estimations at the 
individual level are overall at least an order of magnitude less accurate than estimations at the 
level of 𝑁𝑁 = 20 or 𝑁𝑁 = 160 subjects. This highlights the benefit of using more parsimonious 
models instead of relying on estimations at the individual level. 
Online Supplement
The Many Faces of Human Sociality – Online Supplement  4 
• If the random errors are serially correlated, i.e. 𝜌𝜌 ∈ 	 {0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8}, estimations with 𝑁𝑁 = 1 
subject are biased. The bias is particularly severe for high serial correlations, i.e. 𝜌𝜌 = 0.6 or 
𝜌𝜌 = 0.8. However, the bias quickly vanishes if the number of subjects increases: with 𝑁𝑁 = 20 
subjects, it is negligible for all but the highest values of 𝜌𝜌; with 𝑁𝑁 = 160 subjects it is negligible 
for all values of 𝜌𝜌. Similarly, the MSEs indicate that with 𝑁𝑁 = 20 subjects, estimations are 
overall accurate for all but the highest values of 𝜌𝜌, while with 𝑁𝑁 = 160 subjects estimations 
are overall highly accurate for all values of 𝜌𝜌. 
In sum, the above results on the estimators for the behavioral model’s parameters indicate that, as long 
as we do not rely on estimations at the individual level, the experimental design and the empirical 
strategy allow us to estimate the true parameters with high overall accuracy. This holds regardless of 
the considered preference type and even if the random errors in the subjects’ utility are serially 
correlated across games. 
The results on the estimator of the choice sensitivity 𝜎𝜎 are different, however. Serial correlation in the 
random error seems to cause a downward-bias in the estimator of 𝜎𝜎 that (i) becomes more pronounced 
when 𝜌𝜌 gets bigger and (ii) persists if the number of subjects increases. Hence, we may underestimate 
how sensitive the subjects’ choices react to utility differences. This would lead to overly conservative 
prediction intervals when using our model to make behavioral predictions. 
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True   Bias  MSE 
Parameter 𝜌𝜌  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160 
          
𝛼𝛼 = 0.00 0.0  -0.011 -0.002  0.000   0.025 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  -0.012  0.000  0.000   0.024 0.001 0.000 
 0.4  -0.010 -0.004 -0.002   0.030 0.002 0.000 
 0.6   0.186 -0.004 -0.004   6.357 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   1.979  0.095 -0.004  46.515 1.948 0.000 
          
𝛽𝛽 = 0.00 0.0  -0.007 -0.002  0.000   0.022 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  -0.014 -0.003 -0.001   0.025 0.001 0.000 
 0.4  -0.026 -0.002 -0.002   0.029 0.001 0.000 
 0.6   0.126 -0.003 -0.004   2.896 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   2.065  0.157 -0.004  47.311 5.089 0.000 
          
𝛾𝛾 = 0.00 0.0  0.001 0.001  0.000   0.032 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  0.002 0.000  0.000   0.033 0.002 0.000 
 0.4  0.002 0.000 -0.001   0.038 0.002 0.000 
 0.6  0.095 0.002  0.001   4.172 0.002 0.000 
 0.8  1.448 0.061  0.001  34.555 0.695 0.000 
          
𝛿𝛿 = 0.00 0.0   0.003 0.002 0.000   0.031 0.002 0.000 
 0.2  -0.001 0.000 0.000   0.034 0.002 0.000 
 0.4   0.004 0.001 0.000   0.041 0.002 0.000 
 0.6   0.155 0.002 0.000   3.371 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   1.349 0.133 0.001  32.445 3.659 0.000 
          
𝜎𝜎 = 0.01 0.0   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.2   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.4   0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.6  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.8  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Biases and Mean Squared Errors (MSE) are calculated based on 1,000 simulation runs, each with 𝑁𝑁 ∈
	{1,20,160} subjects. The subjects’ simulated choices are based on the random utility model presented 
in section 3.1 of the paper, using the true parameters shown in the first column. To simulate the effect 
of serially correlated errors across games, the errors of each subject follow an AR(1) process with 
serial correlation 𝜌𝜌 and type-1-extreme-value-distributed innovations. The simulation considers that 
games were presented in random order within the blocks of dictator and reciprocity games. 
 
Table S1: Results of Simulation 1 with selfish subjects. 
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Figure S1: Bias in parameter estimates in Simulation 1 with selfish subjects.  
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True   Bias  MSE 
Parameter 𝜌𝜌  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160 
          
𝛼𝛼 = 0.20 0.0  -0.003 -0.001  0.000   0.021 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  -0.013 -0.001  0.000   0.022 0.001 0.000 
 0.4  -0.010 -0.002 -0.001   0.026 0.001 0.000 
 0.6   0.003 -0.002 -0.002   2.486 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   0.053  0.021  0.001  40.397 0.295 0.000 
          
𝛽𝛽 = 0.50 0.0   0.008  0.000  0.000   0.023 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  -0.003  0.000  0.000   0.024 0.001 0.000 
 0.4   0.003  0.001 -0.001   0.029 0.001 0.000 
 0.6  -0.091  0.001  0.000   4.018 0.002 0.000 
 0.8  -1.722 -0.054  0.003  62.936 1.600 0.000 
          
𝛾𝛾 = 0.15 0.0  -0.006  0.000  0.000   0.028 0.001 0.000 
 0.2   0.011  0.001  0.000   0.029 0.001 0.000 
 0.4   0.001  0.000  0.001   0.032 0.002 0.000 
 0.6  -0.093  0.001  0.001   4.132 0.002 0.000 
 0.8  -1.487 -0.048 -0.002  45.587 1.292 0.001 
          
𝛿𝛿 = −0.10 0.0  -0.009  0.002  0.000   0.028 0.001 0.000 
 0.2   0.006  0.001  0.000   0.030 0.001 0.000 
 0.4  -0.006  0.000  0.000   0.036 0.002 0.000 
 0.6  -0.031 -0.001  0.000   1.287 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   0.276  0.023 -0.003  34.558 0.438 0.001 
          
𝜎𝜎 = 0.01 0.0   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.2   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.4   0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.6  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.8  -0.005 -0.004 -0.004  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Biases and Mean Squared Errors (MSE) are calculated based on 1,000 simulation runs, each with 𝑁𝑁 ∈
	{1,20,160} subjects. The subjects’ simulated choices are based on the random utility model presented 
in section 3.1 of the paper, using the true parameters shown in the first column. To simulate the effect 
of serially correlated errors across games, the errors of each subject follow an AR(1) process with 
serial correlation 𝜌𝜌 and type-1-extreme-value-distributed innovations. The simulation considers that 
games were presented in random order within the blocks of dictator and reciprocity games. 
 
Table S2: Results of Simulation 2 with strongly altruistic subjects.  
Online Supplement
The Many Faces of Human Sociality – Online Supplement  8 
 
 
Figure S2: Bias in parameter estimates in Simulation 2 with strongly altruistic subjects.  
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True   Bias  MSE 
Parameter 𝜌𝜌  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160 
          
𝛼𝛼 = 0.05 0.0  -0.008 -0.002  0.000   0.023 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  -0.008  0.001  0.000   0.026 0.001 0.000 
 0.4  -0.019 -0.004 -0.002   0.057 0.001 0.000 
 0.6   0.145 -0.003 -0.003   4.159 0.001 0.000 
 0.8   2.095  0.089 -0.003  49.951 1.589 0.000 
          
𝛽𝛽 = 0.10 0.0  -0.009 -0.002  0.000   0.022 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  -0.013 -0.001 -0.001   0.027 0.001 0.000 
 0.4  -0.015 -0.001 -0.002   0.029 0.001 0.000 
 0.6   0.197 -0.004 -0.003   4.890 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   1.722  0.158 -0.002  47.662 4.096 0.000 
          
𝛾𝛾 = 0.00 0.0  -0.005  0.001 0.000   0.029 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  -0.002 -0.001 0.000   0.035 0.002 0.000 
 0.4   0.015  0.000 0.000   0.139 0.002 0.000 
 0.6   0.194  0.001 0.000   3.900 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   1.287  0.063 0.001  39.949 0.760 0.000 
          
𝛿𝛿 = −0.05 0.0   0.002  0.002 0.000   0.029 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  -0.004 -0.002 0.000   0.035 0.002 0.000 
 0.4  -0.004  0.001 0.000   0.060 0.002 0.000 
 0.6   0.077  0.001 0.000   3.361 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   1.244  0.129 0.000  35.938 3.374 0.000 
          
𝜎𝜎 = 0.01 0.0   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.2   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.4   0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.6  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.8  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Biases and Mean Squared Errors (MSE) are calculated based on 1,000 simulation runs, each with 𝑁𝑁 ∈
	{1,20,160} subjects. The subjects’ simulated choices are based on the random utility model presented 
in section 3.1 of the paper, using the true parameters shown in the first column. To simulate the effect 
of serially correlated errors across games, the errors of each subject follow an AR(1) process with 
serial correlation 𝜌𝜌 and type-1-extreme-value-distributed innovations. The simulation considers that 
games were presented in random order within the blocks of dictator and reciprocity games. 
 
Table S3: Results of Simulation 3 with moderately altruistic subjects.  
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Figure S3: Bias in parameter estimates in Simulation 3 with moderately altruistic subjects.  
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True   Bias  MSE 
Parameter 𝜌𝜌  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160 
          
𝛼𝛼 = −0.35 0.0  -0.016 -0.004 -0.001   0.036 0.002 0.000 
 0.2  -0.020  0.000  0.000   0.035 0.002 0.000 
 0.4  -0.024 -0.003 -0.001   0.044 0.002 0.000 
 0.6   0.047 -0.004 -0.004   1.821 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   2.745 -0.009 -0.008  59.811 0.005 0.001 
          
𝛽𝛽 = 0.00 0.0  -0.010 -0.003  0.000   0.029 0.001 0.000 
 0.2  -0.009 -0.002 -0.001   0.030 0.001 0.000 
 0.4  -0.018 -0.001 -0.002   0.032 0.001 0.000 
 0.6   0.106 -0.002 -0.003   2.058 0.002 0.000 
 0.8   2.172 -0.006 -0.003  50.978 0.003 0.000 
          
𝛾𝛾 = 0.10 0.0  -0.002  0.002 0.000   0.042 0.002 0.000 
 0.2   0.007 -0.001 0.000   0.040 0.002 0.000 
 0.4   0.002  0.000 0.000   0.047 0.002 0.000 
 0.6   0.103  0.001 0.001   1.604 0.003 0.000 
 0.8   1.497  0.003 0.003  30.262 0.004 0.000 
          
𝛿𝛿 = −0.05 0.0  -0.003  0.002 0.000   0.041 0.002 0.000 
 0.2  -0.005 -0.002 0.000   0.045 0.002 0.000 
 0.4   0.011  0.000 0.000   0.049 0.002 0.000 
 0.6   0.057 -0.001 0.000   1.438 0.003 0.000 
 0.8   1.600  0.002 0.002  32.746 0.004 0.001 
          
𝜎𝜎 = 0.01 0.0   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.2   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.4   0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.6  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.8  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Biases and Mean Squared Errors (MSE) are calculated based on 1,000 simulation runs, each with 𝑁𝑁 ∈
	{1,20,160} subjects. The subjects’ simulated choices are based on the random utility model presented 
in section 3.1 of the paper, using the true parameters shown in the first column. To simulate the effect 
of serially correlated errors across games, the errors of each subject follow an AR(1) process with 
serial correlation 𝜌𝜌 and type-1-extreme-value-distributed innovations. The simulation considers that 
games were presented in random order within the blocks of dictator and reciprocity games. 
 
Table S4: Results of Simulation 4 with behindness averse subjects.  
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Figure S4: Bias in parameter estimates in Simulation 4 with behindness averse subjects. 
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2 Monte Carlo simulations: Parameter recovery and impact of 
serially correlated errors in the finite mixture model 
This section presents two Monte Carlo simulations in the context of the finite mixture model with 𝐾𝐾 =
3 types. As in section 1 of this online supplement, the main goals are twofold: (i) to examine whether 
the finite mixture model reliably recovers the true parameters – and in particular, whether it 
discriminates well between selfish and moderately altruistic behavior – and (ii) to assess the impact of 
serially correlated errors. 
2.1 Set-up 
The two Monte Carlo simulations have a similar set-up as the ones described in section 1.1 of this online 
supplement. In each of the 𝑅𝑅 = 1,000 simulation runs, we first simulate the subjects’ choices in the 
dictator and reciprocity games based on the random utility model described in section 3.1 of the paper. 
Subsequently, we estimate a finite mixture model with 𝐾𝐾 = 3 types. After completing all simulation 
runs, we calculate the bias and the overall accuracy (i.e. MSE) of each parameter. 
However, in contrast to the simulations shown in section 1 of this online supplement, we now consider 
heterogeneous populations that consist of the following three preference types: 
   True parameters 
Simulation Preference Types N 𝛼𝛼O 𝛽𝛽O 𝛾𝛾O 𝛿𝛿O 𝜎𝜎O 
5 Moderately Altruistic (MA) 80 0.05 0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.03 
 Strongly Altruistic (SA) 60 0.20 0.50 0.15 -0.05 0.02 
 Behindness Averse (BA) 20 -0.15 -0.40 0.20 -0.10 0.01 
6 Selfish (SF) 80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Strongly Altruistic (SA) 60 0.20 0.50 0.15 -0.05 0.02 
 Behindness Averse (BA) 20 -0.15 -0.40 0.20 -0.10 0.01 
 
In Simulation 5, the MA, SA, and BA types’ sizes and parameters closely resemble the estimates of the 
finite mixture model in Session 1 (see Table 2 in the paper). This allows us to check whether the finite 
mixture model can recover the parameters of a sample that is similar to the one elicited in our 
experiment. In Simulation 6, the MA type is replaced by a selfish (SF) type. This enables us to check 
whether the finite mixture model could also reliably pick up a selfish type. 
We also consider the impact of serially correlated errors. Hence, the simulated random errors in a 
subject’s utility follow an AR(1) process across games with serial correlation 𝜌𝜌 ∈ 	 {0, 0.5, 0.8} and type-
1-extreme-value-distributed innovations. As in the simulations before, the order of games within the 
blocks of dictator and reciprocity games is randomly reshuffled in each simulation run. This random 
reshuffling takes into account that in the experiment, the games were presented in random order within 
the blocks of dictator and reciprocity games (see section 2.3 in the paper). 
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2.2 Results 
Tables S5 and S6 show the results for Simulation 5 and 6, respectively.  
The results are qualitatively similar to the ones of the aggregate model with 𝑁𝑁 = 160 subjects. If there 
is no or only moderate serial correlation in the errors, i.e. 𝜌𝜌 ∈ {0,0.5}, the finite mixture models’ 
estimators are virtually unbiased and exhibit great overall accuracy. If there is strong serial correlation 
in the errors, i.e. 𝜌𝜌 = 0.8, the estimators tend to be slightly biased and their overall accuracy is 
somewhat lower. However, relative to the size of the true parameters the bias is negligible. In sum, 
these results highlight the finite mixture model’s efficiency in taking the prevalent heterogeneity into 
account. 
Moreover, Table S6 also reveals that the finite mixture model could reliably uncover a group of selfish 
subjects, even if the errors in the subjects’ utility are serially correlated. The estimators for the simulated 
SF-type are virtually unbiased and overall very accurate. Consequently, if there were a distinct type of 
selfish subjects in our experimental data, we would have most likely detected it – in particular once we 
increased the number of types from 𝐾𝐾 = 3 to 𝐾𝐾 = 4. 
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 Preference  Bias  MSE 
𝜌𝜌 Type  𝜋𝜋O  𝛼𝛼O  𝛽𝛽O  𝛾𝛾O  𝛿𝛿O  𝜎𝜎O   𝜋𝜋O  𝛼𝛼O  𝛽𝛽O  𝛾𝛾O  𝛿𝛿O  𝜎𝜎O  
0.0 MA   0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 SA   0.000  0.000  0.000 0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 BA      – -0.003  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000     – 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 
0.5 MA   0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000  0.001 -0.004  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 SA   0.000 -0.002  0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 BA      – -0.004 -0.004 0.001  0.001 -0.001     – 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.000 
0.8 MA   0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.000  0.001 -0.012  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 SA  -0.004 -0.003  0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.008  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 BA      – -0.007 -0.003 0.007 -0.001 -0.004     – 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.000 
Biases and Mean Squared Errors (MSE) are calculated based on 1,000 simulation runs. The subjects’ simulated choices are based on the random utility 
model presented in section 3.1 of the paper, using the true parameters shown in Section 2.1 of this online supplement. To simulate the effect of serially 
correlated errors across games, the errors of each subject follow an AR(1) process with serial correlation ρ and type-1-extreme-value-distributed 
innovations. The simulation considers that games were presented in random order within the blocks of dictator and reciprocity games. The estimator of 
the mixing proportion of the BA-type, 𝜋𝜋QR, has no bias and MSE because it is not a separately estimated parameter and given by 𝜋𝜋QR = 1 −	𝜋𝜋SR −
𝜋𝜋TR. 
 
Table S5: Results of Simulation 5 with a mixture of 80 MA-, 60 SA-, and 20 BA-types. 
 
 
 Preference  Bias  MSE 
𝜌𝜌 Type  𝜋𝜋O  𝛼𝛼O  𝛽𝛽O  𝛾𝛾O  𝛿𝛿O  𝜎𝜎O   𝜋𝜋O  𝛼𝛼O  𝛽𝛽O  𝛾𝛾O  𝛿𝛿O  𝜎𝜎O  
0.0 SF   0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 SA   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 BA      – -0.002 -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000     – 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 
0.5 SF   0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.001  0.000 -0.004  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 SA   0.000 -0.002  0.001  0.002  0.000 -0.003  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 BA      – -0.003 -0.004 -0.001  0.002 -0.001     – 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.000 
0.8 SF   0.000 -0.004 -0.001  0.000 -0.001 -0.012  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 SA  -0.002 -0.003  0.002  0.002 -0.003 -0.008  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 BA      – -0.004 -0.004  0.001  0.001 -0.004     – 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.000 
Biases and Mean Squared Errors (MSE) are calculated based on 1,000 simulation runs. The subjects’ simulated choices are based on the random utility 
model presented in section 3.1 of the paper, using the true parameters shown in Section 2.1 of this online supplement. To simulate the effect of serially 
correlated errors across games, the errors of each subject follow an AR(1) process with serial correlation ρ and type-1-extreme-value-distributed 
innovations. The simulation considers that games were presented in random order within the blocks of dictator and reciprocity games. The estimator of 
the mixing proportion of the BA-type, 𝜋𝜋QR, has no bias and MSE because it is not a separately estimated parameter and given by 𝜋𝜋QR = 1 −	𝜋𝜋TU − 𝜋𝜋TR. 
 
Table S6: Results of Simulation 6 with a mixture of 80 SF-, 60 SA-, and 20 BA-types. 
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3 Behavioral model with a CES utility function 
This section considers a more general specification of the behavioral model, which is inspired by 
Fisman et al. (2007). In this specification, player A’s deterministic utility,  
𝑈𝑈R = 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 − 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 − 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∗ (ΠR)[ + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∗ (ΠQ)[
E
[, (S3) 
exhibits constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between her own and player B’s payoff, where 𝜁𝜁 ≤ 1 
represents the curvature of the indifference curves, and 𝜂𝜂 = (𝜁𝜁 − 1)_E is the elasticity of substitution.  
The behavioral model with CES utility nests the one with piecewise linear utility as a special case, since 
for 𝜁𝜁 = 1, 𝑈𝑈R = 𝑈𝑈R (see also equation (2) in the paper). Moreover, for 𝜁𝜁 < 1, the indifference curves 
are strictly convex, and the behavioral model with CES utility could also rationalize an interior solution 
if A had to choose ΠR and ΠQ from a continuous budget set. 
3.1 Monte Carlo simulation 
This subsection applies a Monte Carlo simulation to examine how well the behavioral model with CES 
utility performs relative to the one with piecewise linear utility in our experimental data. This is an 
important question, as on the one hand the model with CES utility is more general, but the on the other 
hand, the binary dictator and reciprocity games are specifically designed to reliably identify the weights 
player A puts on B’s payoff in the context of piecewise linear utility. 
3.1.1 Set-up 
The Monte Carlo simulation has a set-up similar to the one described in section 1.1 of this online 
supplement. In each simulation run, we first simulate the choices of 𝑁𝑁 ∈ 	 {1,20,160} subjects in the 
dictator and reciprocity games. We apply a random utility model with CES utility and parameters 
similar to the ones obtained in the aggregate estimations – i.e. 𝛼𝛼 = 0.10, 𝛽𝛽 = 0.25, 𝛾𝛾 = 0.05, 𝛿𝛿 =
−0.05, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.01 – and a curvature of the indifference curves corresponding to 𝜁𝜁 ∈ 	 {1,0.5,0.1, −1, −5}. 
Subsequently, we try to recover the true parameters by estimating two versions of the random utility 
model on the simulated choices: one with CES utility 𝑈𝑈R and the other with piecewise linear utility 𝑈𝑈R. 
3.1.2 Results 
Tables S7 and S8 present the results in terms of bias and MSE, respectively. In both tables, the first set 
of columns shows the results for the version of the random utility model with CES utility 𝑈𝑈R, while the 
second set of columns shows the results of the version with piecewise linear utility 𝑈𝑈R. 
If the simulated choices stem from a piecewise linear utility function, i.e. 𝜁𝜁 = 1, the performance of 
both versions of the random utility models is nearly identical. Except for 𝑁𝑁 = 1, the estimators are both 
virtually unbiased and with MSEs close to zero also very accurate overall. This is not surprising, as the 
version of the random utility model with piecewise linear utility is correctly specified and the more 
general version with CES utility nests 𝜁𝜁 = 1 as a special case. 
However, if the simulated choices stem from a CES utility function with strictly convex indifference 
curves, i.e. 𝜁𝜁 ∈ 0.5,0.1, −1, −5 , there are important differences in the performance of the two versions 
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of the model. In terms of bias, shown in Table S7, the differences in performance can be summarized 
as follows: 
• The version of the random utility model with CES utility yields estimators of the behavioral 
parameters with small to negligible bias, unless 𝑁𝑁 = 1 and/or 𝜁𝜁 is very small. However, the 
estimator of 𝜁𝜁 tends to be downward-biased, even if 𝑁𝑁 = 20. Hence, the model has problems 
to recover the curvature of the indifference curves from the binary choices in the dictator and 
reciprocity games.  
• The version of the random utility model with piecewise linear utility yields estimators of the 
distributional parameters 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 that are biased regardless of the number of subjects. However, 
the absolute size of the bias is relatively small if the indifference curves are not overly convex. 
Only if 𝜁𝜁 < 0.5, the absolute size of the bias becomes severe. Interestingly, the estimators of 𝛾𝛾 
and 𝛿𝛿 that measure how the weight on B’s payoff changes under positive and negative 
reciprocity seem to be unbiased. 
Hence, in case we only consider the bias in the estimators – in particular those of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 – the general 
version of the random utility model with CES utility outperforms the version with piecewise linear 
utility if 𝜁𝜁 < 1. However, this result changes in case we also consider the estimators’ overall accuracy, 
i.e. their MSEs as shown in Table S8: 
• The version of the random utility model with CES utility yields estimators of the distributional 
parameters 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 that are inaccurate – especially if 𝜁𝜁 is small. If 𝜁𝜁 drops below 1, the 
estimators remain (nearly) unbiased but their variance quickly increases, leading to poor overall 
accuracy. 
• In contrast, the version of the random utility model with piecewise linear utility yields 
estimators that, with some exceptions, are equally accurate or sometimes even more accurate 
overall than the ones of the model with CES utility. If 𝜁𝜁 drops below 1, the estimators of the 
model with piecewise linear utility are biased but their variance remains relatively low. 
In conclusion, these results imply that, in case we consider the overall accuracy of the estimators, the 
general version of the random utility model with CES utility does not offer much benefit over the more 
parsimonious model with piecewise linear utility. Note that this conclusion is probably highly specific 
to our data, which stems from an experiment designed to elicit how subjects weight another player’s 
payoff with a series of easy-to-grasp, binary dictator and reciprocity games. We expect the general 
model with CES utility to perform much better in data stemming from experiments that are specifically 
designed to estimate a CES utility function and allow the subjects to also make interior choices, such 
as the one presented in Fisman et al. (2007). However, as the general version of the random utility 
model with CES utility has no advantage in our data, we stick to the more parsimonious version with 
piecewise linear utility. 
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True   Bias: CES utility 𝑈𝑈R  Bias: piecewise linear utility 𝑈𝑈R 
Parameter 𝜁𝜁  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160 
          
𝛼𝛼 = 0.10 1   0.008  0.000  0.000   0.008  0.000  0.000 
 0.5   0.068  0.029  0.003  -0.041 -0.048 -0.047 
 0.1   0.013  0.026  0.003  -0.080 -0.081 -0.081 
 -1  -0.950  0.041  0.007  -0.154 -0.150 -0.148 
 -5  -8.413 -2.424 -0.111  -0.183 -0.181 -0.181 
          
𝛽𝛽 = 0.25 1  -0.009  0.001  0.000  -0.009 0.001 0.000 
 0.5  -0.049 -0.015 -0.002   0.098 0.101 0.101 
 0.1  -0.022 -0.012 -0.002   0.186 0.194 0.193 
 -1   0.402 -0.015 -0.002   0.424 0.421 0.422 
 -5   3.521  0.679  0.025   0.670 0.665 0.662 
          
𝛾𝛾 = 0.05 1  -0.005 -0.002  0.000  -0.005 -0.002  0.000 
 0.5  -0.007 -0.004 -0.001  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 0.1   0.003 -0.003  0.000  -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 
 -1   0.143 -0.003 -0.001  -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 
 -5   0.637  0.103  0.002  -0.033 -0.034 -0.033 
          
𝛿𝛿 = −0.05 1   0.005 -0.001  0.000  0.005 -0.001 0.000 
 0.5   0.010  0.005  0.000  0.001  0.002 0.001 
 0.1   0.023  0.003  0.001  0.006  0.001 0.002 
 -1   0.044  0.005  0.000  0.018  0.013 0.012 
 -5  -0.100 -0.088 -0.005  0.024  0.030 0.031 
          
𝜁𝜁 1   0.000  0.000  0.000  – – – 
 0.5  -0.963 -0.175 -0.014  – – – 
 0.1  -1.050 -0.155 -0.016  – – – 
 -1  -1.737 -0.294 -0.032  – – – 
 -5  -3.434 -3.110 -0.883  – – – 
          
𝜎𝜎 = 0.01 1  0.001 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 
 0.5  0.001 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 
 0.1  0.001 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 
 -1  0.002 0.000 0.000  0.002 0.001 0.001 
 -5  0.007 0.001 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 
Biases in the estimators of the random models with CES utility and piecewise linear utility are 
calculated based on 1,000 simulation runs, each with 𝑁𝑁 ∈ 	 {1,20,160} subjects. The subjects’ 
simulated choices are based on a random utility model with CES utility with parameters as shown in 
the first column and a varying curvature of the indifference curves 𝜁𝜁 ∈ 1,0.5,0.1, −1, −5 . 
 
Table S7: Bias in estimators of random utility models with CES and piecewise linear utility. 
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True   MSE: CES utility 𝑈𝑈R  MSE: piecewise linear utility 𝑈𝑈R 
Parameter 𝜁𝜁  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160  𝑁𝑁 = 1 𝑁𝑁 = 20 𝑁𝑁 = 160 
          
𝛼𝛼 = 0.10 1    0.018  0.001 0.000  0.018 0.001 0.000 
 0.5    0.131  0.011 0.001  0.022 0.004 0.002 
 0.1    1.038  0.012 0.001  0.026 0.008 0.007 
 -1   85.827  0.035 0.003  0.045 0.023 0.022 
 -5  538.259 64.138 3.156  0.059 0.034 0.033 
          
𝛽𝛽 = 0.25 1    0.021 0.001 0.000  0.021 0.001 0.000 
 0.5    0.039 0.009 0.001  0.029 0.011 0.010 
 0.1    0.158 0.009 0.001  0.054 0.038 0.037 
 -1   10.109 0.014 0.002  0.199 0.178 0.178 
 -5  103.064 5.896 0.203  0.479 0.443 0.438 
          
𝛾𝛾 = 0.05 1   0.026 0.001 0.000  0.026 0.001 0.000 
 0.5   0.042 0.001 0.000  0.028 0.001 0.000 
 0.1   0.136 0.001 0.000  0.024 0.001 0.000 
 -1  12.141 0.002 0.000  0.025 0.002 0.000 
 -5  74.525 0.671 0.004  0.034 0.003 0.001 
          
𝛿𝛿 = −0.05 1   0.025 0.001 0.000  0.025 0.001 0.000 
 0.5   0.029 0.001 0.000  0.028 0.001 0.000 
 0.1   0.110 0.001 0.000  0.025 0.001 0.000 
 -1  10.160 0.002 0.000  0.027 0.001 0.000 
 -5  48.832 0.363 0.014  0.033 0.002 0.001 
          
𝜁𝜁 1   0.000  0.000 0.000  – – – 
 0.5   3.630  0.426 0.024  – – – 
 0.1   4.356  0.398 0.026  – – – 
 -1   9.381  0.965 0.057  – – – 
 -5  96.690 57.138 7.619  – – – 
          
𝜎𝜎 = 0.01 1  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.5  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.1  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 -1  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 -5  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
MSEs in the estimators of the random models with CES utility and piecewise linear utility are 
calculated based on 1,000 simulation runs, each with 𝑁𝑁 ∈ 	 {1,20,160} subjects. The subjects’ 
simulated choices are based on a random utility model with CES utility with parameters as shown in 
the first column and a varying curvature of the indifference curves 𝜁𝜁 ∈ 1,0.5,0.1, −1, −5 . 
 
Table S8: Mean Squared Errors (MSEs) in estimators of random utility models with CES and 
piecewise linear utility. 
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3.2 Aggregate estimation 
We also estimated the aggregate parameters in Sessions 1 and 2 using the general version of the random 
utility model with CES utility. As this general version of the model nests the model with piecewise 
linear utility as a special case, we can test whether the subjects’ choices reject the assumption of 
piecewise linearity. 
Table S9 shows the results. In both sessions, the estimates of 𝜁𝜁 are very close to 1 and we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the subjects’ utility is piecewise linear. As expected, considering the results of 
the previous Monte Carlo simulation (section 3.1 of this online supplement), the other parameter 
estimates nearly coincide with the ones reported in Table 1 of the paper. 
 
 Estimates of 
Session 1 
Estimates of 
Session 2 
p-value of z-test with  
H0: Session1=Session2 
a: Weight on other’s payoff 0.088*** 0.103*** 0.521 
when behind (0.018) (0.014)  
b: Weight on other’s payoff 0.253*** 0.237*** 0.570 
when ahead (0.021) (0.020)  
g: Measure of positive 0.071*** 0.028*** 0.011 
reciprocity (0.014) (0.010)  
d: Measure of negative -0.042*** -0.044*** 0.919 
reciprocity (0.011) (0.009)  
z: Curvature of indifference  0.958*** 0.949*** 0.933 
curves (0.085) (0.062)  
s: Choice sensitivity 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001)  
P-value (H0: z=1) 0.619 0.407  
# of observations 18,720 18,720  
# of subjects 160 160  
Log Likelihood -5,472.20 -4,540.65  
Individual cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Table S9: Preferences of the representative agent (𝐾𝐾 = 1) in Sessions 1 and 2 with CES utility. 
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4 Correlation of psychological and demographic variables with 
individual type-membership 
Table S10 shows that neither the psychological nor the demographic variables are significantly 
correlated with individual type-membership. It exhibits the result of a multinomial logit regression with 
individual type-membership as dependent variable and the various psychological and demographic 
variables as independent variables. The base category is membership in the MA-type. While the 
individual estimates indicate that studying law (being female) is negatively (positively) associated with 
membership in the BA- and SA-type, the likelihood ratio tests at the bottom of the table reveal that the 
estimated coefficients are jointly insignificant for the whole regression as well as for various subsets of 
variables.  
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Multinomial logit regression with  
dependent variable: type-membership 
base category: Moderately Altruistic (MA) type 
Behindness Averse 
(BA) type 
Strongly Altruistic 
(SA) type 
Constant -2.278 (3.437) -1.515 (2.026) 
Big 5: consciousness -0.170 (0.101) * -0.098 (0.065) 
Big 5: openness -0.003 (0.080) -0.014 (0.050) 
Big 5: extraversion 0.065 (0.080) -0.009 (0.050) 
Big 5: agreeableness 0.074 (0.104) 0.100 (0.071) 
Big 5: neuroticism 0.081 (0.077) 0.080 (0.048) * 
Cognitive ability score  -0.005 (0.122) 0.018 (0.079) 
Field of study: natural sciences -1.221 (0.978) -0.566 (0.729) 
Field of study: law -2.422 (1.464) * -2.482 (1.294) * 
Field of study: social sciences -1.725 (1.385) -0.127 (0.828) 
Field of study: medicine -17.165 (1855.68) -0.535 (0.861) 
Monthly income (1,000 CHF) -0.906 (0.962) 0.204 (0.414) 
Age -0.076 (0.107) -0.038 (0.061) 
Female 1.263 (0.682) * 0.847 (0.414) ** 
# of observations / subjects 160 
Log likelihood -132.49 
P-values of likelihood ratio tests  
H0: All coefficients jointly insignificant 0.181 
H0: Big 5 measures jointly insignificant 0.374 
H0: Field-of-study-dummies jointly insignificant 0.161 
H0: M.inc., age, female jointly insignificant 0.221 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  
As the model is non-linear, only the coefficients’ signs and significance are directly interpretable: a 
positive (negative) sign indicates that the variable has a positive (negative) effect on the probability of 
being associated with the corresponding type. 
 
Table S10: Multinomial logit regression showing that individual type-membership is not correlated 
with Big 5 personality traits, cognitive ability, field of study, and other socio-economic 
characteristics.  
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5 Figures of the Paper in Color and Serif Free Font 
 
Figure S5 (Analogue to Figure 1 in the paper): The dictator games. Each of the three circles 
contains 13 binary dictator games. Each game is represented by the two payoff allocations connected 
by a grey line. Player A can choose one of the extreme points on the line. For every game, the slope of 
the grey line indicates A’s cost of altering player B’s payoff. Allocations above (below) the dashed 
45° line help identifying the weight player A puts on B’s payoff under disadvantageous 
(advantageous) inequality. 
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Figure S6 (Analogue to Figure 2 in the paper): Representative agent’s empirical and predicted 
willingness to change the other player’s payoff across cost levels in Session 1. The empirical 
willingness corresponds to the fraction of subjects that chose to change the other player’s payoff in 
the indicated direction. The predicted willingness corresponds to the predicted probability that the 
representative agent changes the other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. It is based on the 
random utility model presented in Section 3.1 and uses the estimated aggregate parameters of Session 
1 on all dictator and reciprocity games. 
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Figure S7 (Analogue to Figure 3 in the paper): Normalized entropy criterion (NEC) for different 
numbers of preference types in Sessions 1 and 2. The NEC summarizes the ambiguity in the subjects’ 
classification into types relative to the finite mixture model’s improvement in fit compared to the 
representative agent model with K = 1 (see equations 8 and 9). By minimizing the NEC, we can 
determine the optimal number of preference types 𝐾𝐾 the finite mixture model should take into account. 
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Figure S8 (Analogue to Figure 4 in the paper): Temporal stability of the type-specific parameter 
estimates of the finite mixture models with 𝐾𝐾 = 3 preference types. The type-specific parameter 
estimates are stable over time as their 95% confidence intervals overlap between Session 1 and 2. )). 
Moderately Altruistic (MA) Types are shown in green, Strongly Altruistic (SA) Types in blue, and 
Behindness Averse (BA) Types in red. 
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Figure S9 (Analogue to Figure 5 in the paper): Empirical and predicted willingness to change the 
other player’s payoff of the different preference types across cost levels in Session 1. The empirical 
willingness corresponds to the fraction of subjects of a given preference type that chose to change the 
other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. The predicted willingness corresponds to the predicted 
probability that a given preference type changes the other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. It 
is based on the random utility model presented in Section 3.1 and uses the estimated type-specific 
parameters of Session 1 on all dictator and reciprocity games. 
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Figure S10 (Analogue to Figure 6 in the paper): Distribution of individual-specific parameter 
estimates along with type-specific parameter estimates (𝐾𝐾 = 3 model) in Session 1. The colors of the 
individual-specific estimates indicate the underlying subjects’ classification into preference types 
according to the individual posterior probabilities of type-membership (see equation (7)): Moderately 
Altruistic (MA) Types are shown in green, Strongly Altruistic (SA) Types in blue, and Behindness 
Averse (BA) Types in red. 
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Figure S11 (Analogue to Figure 8 in the paper): Empirical and predicted mean trustworthiness of the 
different preference types across cost levels (with 95% confidence intervals). The empirical mean 
trustworthiness corresponds to the fraction of subjects of a preference type that chose the trustworthy 
action at a given cost of being trustworthy. The predicted trustworthiness corresponds to the predicted 
probability that a subject of a given preference type chooses the trustworthy action at a given cost of 
being trustworthy. The predicted probability is based on the random utility model presented in Section 
3.1 and uses the estimated type-specific parameters of Session 2. 
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Figure S12 (Analogue to Figure 9 in the paper): Empirical and predicted mean reward and 
punishment of player A in response to player B’s choice (with 95% confidence intervals). The bars 
correspond to the mean reward or punishment level the subjects of a given preference type implement 
in response to player B’s choice. The plus signs correspond to the reward or punishment level a subject 
of a given preference type is predicted to implement in response to player B’s choice. The prediction is 
based on the random utility model presented in Section 3.1 and uses the estimated type-specific 
parameters of Session 2. 
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Figure S13 (Analogue to Figure A3 in the paper): Representative agent’s empirical and predicted 
willingness to change the other player’s payoff across cost levels in Session 2. The empirical 
willingness corresponds to the fraction of subjects that chose to change the other player’s payoff in 
the indicated direction. The predicted willingness corresponds to the predicted probability that the 
representative agent choses to change the other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. It is based 
on the random utility model presented in Section 3.1 and uses the estimated aggregate parameters of 
Session 2 on all dictator and reciprocity games. 
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Figure S14 (Analogue to Figure A4 in the paper): Distribution of posterior probabilities of individual 
type-membership in Sessions 1 (upper row) and 2 (lower row). 
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Figure S15 (Analogue to Figure A5 in the paper): Empirical and predicted willingness of the different 
preference types to change the other player’s payoff across cost levels in Session 2. The empirical 
willingness corresponds to the fraction of subjects of a given preference type that chose to change the 
other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. The predicted willingness corresponds to the predicted 
probability that a given preference type changes the other player’s payoff in the indicated direction. It 
is based on the random utility model presented in Section 3.1 and uses the estimated type-specific 
parameters of Session 2 on all dictator and reciprocity games. 
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Figure S16 (Analogue to Figure A6 in the paper): Distribution of individual-specific parameter 
estimates along with type-specific parameter estimates (𝐾𝐾 = 3 model) in Session 2. The colors of the 
individual-specific estimates indicate the underlying subjects’ classification into preference types 
according to the individual posterior probabilities of type-membership (see equation (7)) )): Moderately 
Altruistic (MA) Types are shown in green, Strongly Altruistic (SA) Types in blue, and Behindness 
Averse (BA) Types in red. 
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